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An American Program
If America is to be regarded as the friend of Asia, not as another
enemy, she should announce now :
1. Intention to withdraw our consulates in China from the
protection of foreign flags, and to retire from participation in the
administration of foreign settlements, concessions, or quarters.
(This, of course, applies particularly to the International Settlement of Shanghai, in whose government we share, and t.o the
humiliating L egation Quarter of Peking.)
2. Renunciation of extraterritoriality.
3. Withdrawal of aU United States troops from Chinese soil
and of United States warships from Chinese waters. This would
mean abatndonment of the six river ships which we are now
building in China f,or the Yangtze River patrol.
4. Abrogation, in so far as the United States is concerned,
of the anach?-onistic clauses of the Boxer protocol which give the
Powers special rights in the Tientsin-Peking area.
5. Recognition by t he United States that China has the right
to fix her customs rates without interf erence by f oreign Powers.
Young China, p. 40.
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AS OTHERS SEE CHINA
An English View

London Daily Express.

It is difficult to shake hands when one has one's hands

full.

A German View

Werner Ha.hm.ann, in "Magdebu,rgisch e Z t>itung."

Profiting by the sword which destroyed the solidarity of the white race.
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i\ Russian View

The United Front of the Imperialists

An American View

Fitzpatrick, in. the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

SHANGHAIED.
v

Pravda.
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Poster from a Peking Wall.
The cha1-acters on the man's arm speU Workers; those on the bell,
Alarm. The strokes from the beU are (1) Restore the Workers'
Federation in Shanghai; (2) We want fre edom of speech and
assembly; (8) Abolition of unequal treatises: Autonomy of Customs; (4) Support the Canton Government.
vi

FOREWORD

That a permanent solution of China's troubles can come itn any
immediate future is unlikely. The causes lie too deep. China has
moved too far into the twentieth century for any singLe despot to be
able to unite her and rule her with an iron wiU. The well-meant
eff,orts of various foreigners since the revolution to aid one strong
man to dominate the country have only aggravated the immense difficulties. of the situation. China is emerging from a patriarchal,
stable, med!ieval civilization into the restless, changing current of
the new industrial world. Indust1"ialism has touched her only here
and there, but it has destroyed the :old equilibrium and upset the old
balances, and the present civil war is revolutionizing China, breaking
up- the ancient stability of the local units, destroying that devotion
to the past 1which was rooted in local customs, local bonds, and local
divinities, teaching the Chinese to work together in masses-and
creating that national consciousness which China has hitherto lacked.
The nationalism which has found its military and political expression in the Canton movement will take years to work out its destiny.
Its immediate goals-to defeat the Northern militarists, to drive out
the foreigner from his position of privilege-are simple compared
with the larger movement. What kind of new China it will organize,
what effect it will have upon the colonial organization of the world,
re?nains to be seen. For the present it needs more patience than the
West is wont to give, and mo1·e time--time for the new generation
to grow into responsibility, time for China to adapt herself to the
twentieth cemtury. To expect peace and law and order from a continent which is trying to compress a thousand years of political and
economic history into ten is absurd. The following pages are an
effort at sympathetic understanding of that enormous processproducts of a winter in China as correspondent of The Nation-and
are, with the exception of a few paragra;phs from an article in Asia
and one section from the New York Times Sunday Magazine, a
development of articles and editorials which have appeared in
The Nation.
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I

''Unchanging China''
CCIDENTALS enter China at Shanghai, the greatest of those
hybrid Eurasian cities known as "treaty ports" and, in some
O
eerie way, the most unpleasant city in the world. Here, in what was
once a swamp outside the city walls, white men have built the greatest
trading city of the East. The old Ohinese town ia only a suburban
slum today; what men 'Call Shanghai is the foreign city, the "International" (British) and French Settlements along the river front.
Here, under European flags and protection, the business of China is
done.
It is a mighty city that the white men have built upon the banks
of the WhiJ,ngpoo. Broad paved streeta; massive stone buildings, as
gloomily vast and permanent as any in London's City; clanging street
cars, electdc ligfu_ts in imitation of Broadway; gas, running water,
sewers, all the trappings of Western civilization that are so uncomfortably misaing in most of China. Automobiles clog the streets; the
telephone system works in English; the pretty river-front park is
"reserved for the foreign community." (Shanghai is politer today
than when the sign read, "Chinese and dogs not allowed.") For miles
faclory chimneys cloud the sky; here, as in the West, men work in
droves of thousands. Here, if anyWhere, the West seems to have made
itself at home in the East.
Yet ten minutes, even in times of calmest peace, in this smoothly
functioning city give one a pani<cky realization that it is neither
Europe nor Asia, but something precariously balanced between them .
Among the autos dodge swarms of ricksha coolies, clad in every imaginable combination of blue cotton rags, some barefoot, some straw-soled,
many naked to the waist--all running, sweating, panting. There is
almost no horse traffic. Men-and sometimes women-pull the carts.
Watch them-each at his rope, six or eight to a cart, straining up the
bridges over Soochow Creek, and you will realize the human meaning
of the simple phrase, "Labor is cheap in China." Nor is it white men
who crowd the sidewalks. Oriental figures-a few in ugly Western
felt hats, coats and trousers, more in skull-caps and stately long silk
robes-make up these sedate throngs. And at every bank, club, hotel,
office-building a huge black-bearded turbaned Sikh stands guard, ready
to cuff out of the way any saucy yellow man.
In Shanghai, as everywhere in China, one is impressed, and often
oppressed, by the sense of the crowd. Here men teem; they swarm ;
the individual seems as insignificant as a single ant in an · ant-hilL
No one knows how many human beings live in Shanghai, for the native
cities that cluster about the foreign settlements have never been adequately counted; but in the foreign cities alone there are a million
1

and a half Chinese and only 40,000 foreigners, of whom more than
half are of races ineligible to citizenship in the United States. The
Chinese form 97 per cent of the population of the cities which white
men govern; they pay 80 per cent of the taxes; but they have no share
in tJhe city administration, their children cannot play in the city park,
and if they want to send their sons to school they must pay for it
themselves. Most of the foreign clubs (the American Club is no exception) do not admit Chinese even as luncheon guests; the line between
white and yellow is drawn as sharply as that between black and white
in Georgia; and one ends by understanding the bitter fear psychology
of the tiny oligarchy which has built this city, is proud of it, and wants
to retain it as a white citadel in a country of 400 million yellow men.
One ends, too, by hating Shanghai; no one, foreigner or Chinese, can
feel at ease there.

*

*

*

*

*

Life is warm and intimate in the narrow old streets of Hangchow. In one shop open broadly to the lane a whole family, from seven
to seventy years old, sociably weaves baskets; another family saws
wood with ancient Chinese saws, and makes the product into furniture; in a third s'hop bronze bells are being cast; and across the street
one family is making brooms, another idols, a third coffins. They live
so close that their lives are interwoven, as is their conversation. No
stranger passes but they all note him; no accident but all share in the
distress and laughter. The hours are long-indeed, there is no respite
except for food and sleep-but there is little strain; work and play
are intermingled.
One suddenly becomes aware that this is the Middle Ages. The
carved wood railings of the second stories; the richness of color and
sound and smell (most of the cooking is done on the street, and the
little restaurants send out a rich cargo of Oriental odors) ; the beautiful shop signs-vertical strips of painted wood inscribed with gilded
Chinese characters-this must be very like the medieval back streets of
those European 'Cities which still preserve their proudest squares to
remind us of what guild life was before the days of factories and
efficiency.
Through the narrow streets dodges an endless line of ricksha
boys, while the occupants strike little foot-bells to emphasize the musical shouts with which the boys warn of their coming. It seems very
ancient, very Oriental. And then one learns that the first ricksha
came to Hangchow fifteen years ago, imported from Japan for an
American missionary, and that the rick~ha itself is a missionary invention only fifty-odd years old. It dawns upon one that China can
c~ange, has changed, is changing. There must be thousands of darting
ricks~a boys in Hangchow today ; fifteen years ago the mandarins
rode m sedan chairs and the merchants walked. One is no longer sur2

prised to turn the corner from these handworkers' shops and find, behind high white walls, a great modern silk facto ry, where thousands
of trousered Chinese girls work thirteen hours, and earn, if t hey are
very skilful, almost twenty-five cents a day.

*

*

*

*

*

Long before Shanghai Canton, far to the south, was opened to
foreign trade. It has been the center of half a dozen wars and nearwars with the "foreign devils," but by some miracle, which may have
its root in the vigor of the Cantonese character, it has maintained its
Chinese soul and its Chinese rule. It is proudly tearing down the narrow lanes and opening wide avenues; it razes temples and creates
schools; it has its own traffic police and a municipal sprinkling-cart;
it even has a ten-story department store, hotel, and moving-picture
palace on the Bund (built by a Chinese peanut vendor born in Australia); but it has not succumbed to the West. Stand, if you doubt it,
at the South Gate of a morning and watch the long lines of coolies pass
out, bearing, trembling from the tips of bamboo polea, great slopping
vessels which contain the night's human refuse without which the
Canton delta, the most densely populated region in the world, could
never maintain its ancient and intensive agriculture. Or watch the
life of the river.
Ocean steamers come up to Canton, but anchor in mid-stream.
The sampans, bobbing on the water with their long and short .oars,
do the rest. Tens of thousands, perthap-s hundreds of thousands, of
sampans line the shores and dot the river for miles. People are born
on them, live their lives on them, die on them. Women with tiny
babies on their backs pull at the oars; solemn-faced children a year
old sit like silent dolls watching their mothers row. Two- and threeyear-olds scamper recklessly from boat to boat; at four or five they
help illleir mothers with the oars. Some sampans carry passengers.
others cabbages, pigs, silk, kindling-wood, offal, whatever comes to
hand. They go where destiny sends them, and tie up where night
fincts them-fifteen- or twenty-deep against the river bank. Riverfolk do not need to go ·a shore for food; itinerant vendors ply their
war~s in and out of the narrow fairways, between the masses of sampans_ selling cotton cloth, charcoal, bean-cake, rice over the gunwales
-the woman working the oars while the man tinkles a bell and sings
his wares. They drink the filthy river water and deposit their refuse
there-Arabs of the waterway, they know no other home.
For centuries they and their ancestors have lived thus-have
watched the first Western ships sail in, seen iron replace wood and
steel iron, watched the coming of steam and of oil fuel-and their
lives go on unchanged. So it seems. But already a score of motor
launches snort up and down the river, doing the work of several hundred sampans; at Whampoa, nine miles downstream, where the cadets
3
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were trained who led the Northern advance of Canton's Nationalist ·
army, modern docks are being built. Men on strike against British
Hongkong dug a road to link Canton and Whampoa; and if ships
come alongside and discharge directly what will become of the sampans? The city has an electric-lighting plant, and there are plans for
supplying power looms to the home workers who spin silk on Honam
Island, between Canton and Whampoa. Already modern-minded Chinese have destroyed the independence of Honam's silk industry and
developed an efficient modern sweatshop system of exploiting home
workers.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Men and camels seem like midgets filing along beneath the colossal walls of Peking-walls so vast and powerful that the gates can
still be shut to •b ar out an invading army. The red and gold doorways of the dusty gray lanes of the Tartar City; the bold red walls
and the smoldering fire of the glazed tile roofs of the Forbidden
City within; the yellows, the blues, the greens, the gleaming contrasts in the painted beams; the vast, perfect proportions of a metropolis laid out as a unit-Peking has something of the grandeur
of Rome, the glory of Greece, the charm of PariS', and is the Eternal
City of China.
So-called. But in reality Peking is no more eternal than Carthage or Ur. It is already half dead. It waa only half a century
ago that the "Old Buddha" built the marvelous gardens known as the
Summer Palace (to replace still more marvelous gardens sacked by
the Vandal British and French, in the Second Opium War), with the
infinite richness of old China-the long painted wood gallery, the
white marble camel-back bridge, the strange piles of lovely buildings
that climb the mountainside. Yet the Summer Palace is already archaeology. It is a museum, a relic of -a past that can never be again.
If you look for unchanging China, do not seek it in the magnificence
of an empire that is gone forever-go to the Chinese village.
In North China the drab villages, built of brown mud •b ricks,
roofed with brown mud, sink ·colorlessly into the brown mud plain.
You do not realize at once how many of them there are. Only a mile
or two separates one cluster of houaes from the next. But these
villages have no shops; they buy and sell at the market-town, and it
may be twenty miles from one market-town to the next.
The market-town of Yenchiu is only .seven miles from Tungchow and the railroad, but the seven miles make a breach of centuries. You croas the Grand Canal on an ancient ferry propelled by
three wild-looking ruffians with poles, and join the parade of overladen donkeys, rickety horse-carts, and warmly padded Chinese. The
road is just a rut across fields of winter wheat, sometimes acroas
4

nothing but blown sand. It seems to stray and wander aimlessly,
finding its true courae only in the villages, where the commerce of
centuries has worn the roads deep beneath the level of the farmyards.
For these villages, rebuilt every few years out of the eternal brown
mud, have histories that antedate Charlemagne.
Yenchiu is just one market-town among tens of thousands scattered over the continent that is China. It is big enough to hold two
inns, where a Chinese traveler may lodge for a:bout one cent a night;
half a dozen herb drug-stores; a wine-shop; two blacksmiths, a draper,
four rice merchants, a ailversmith, a pewter-shop, a saddler, a saltdealer, the inevitable vast pawnshop, and a "foreign-goods shop."
Probably it has had most of these since the remote day in the Sung
dynasty, a thousand years or so ago, when the town's firat mud wall
was built. The "foreign-goods store" has only two foreign commodities---cotton thread, from Japan ; wire nails, from America. "We
used to make our own thread," they will tell you; "but the foreign
thread was so much cheaper that we atopped; now the price has risen,
but we have forgotten how to make our own." Kerosene oil, universal in China, of course comes from abroad. The cotton goods
are of local weave. In the old days, the blacksmith remembers, the
coal came down from the Western Hills by camel; now he uses Manchurian coal mined by the Japanese. The iron used to come from
Huai-lu on the border of Shansi; now it, too, is Japanese. Apart
from that Yenchiu lives as it has lived for centuries-each of the
mud-walled villages about it grows its own crops, makes its own
products, and takes its goods to the market-town of Yenchiu, there
to exchange them for the products of another village. Civil war a
hundred miles away hardly touches them.
Coal and iron and the universal kerosene have done little to
disturb the minds of these villages. Shingtu, five miles away, boasts
two village scholars, one so advanced that he has a daughter studying medicine in far-away America. He is the only man in his village
who has ever sent a child away to study; his is the only family that
does not bind its daughters' feet; yet old Yang, scholar and headman of a village twenty-five miles from Peking, did not know what
were the "unequal treaties" that had fired the youth of the treaty ports,
caused riots, and put China 'On the front pages of newspapers in cities
ten thousand miles away.
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II

A Nation of Anarchists
HINA is an anarchist's heaven.

There is hardly a government

C worthy of the name; people seem to be happ·iest where there is
least government; and the worst evils of Chinese life obviously spring
from the attempts of misguided people to govern her. Where would-be
rulers are missing, China does well enough. Go out into the country
districts, and you will find the Chinese living much as they have lived
for thirty or forty centuries, blissfully unconscious of the necessity
for the elaborate paraphernalia of Western law and order.
"It was the appearance of sages," one of China's wise old men
wrote twenty-odd centuries ago, "which caused the appearance of
robbers. . . . The people were innocent until sages came to worry
them with ceremonies and music in order to rectify them, and dangled
charity and duty to one's neighbor before them in order to satisfy
their hearts-then the people began to stump and limp about in their
love of knowledge and to struggle with each other in their desire for
gain."
We of the West can never, I think, understand China, until we
recover somewhat from our respect for political institutions and grasp
the idea that government is not an end but a means. We are accustomed to thinking in terms of law; the Chinese are not. They have
a magnificent contempt for political government, and a fundamental
instinct for getting along with one another on a basis of custom and
reasonableness which confound.;; the foreigner appalled by their political chaos. It may be inevitable that we shall force respect for
government and written law.;; upon the Chinese, along with Western
efficiency and mechanical ingenuity; but China's ability to get along
in apparent anarchy is really evidence of the profundity of her civilization. Chuang-tzu was right when he said that "ceremonies and
laws are the lowest form of government." China would be in far
worse condition today if she had not acquired through the centuries
a considerable immunity to the ravages of political misgovernment.
A peasant in West China does not care whether the government
in Peking is republican, or monarchist, or soviet-revolutionary, ·as
long as he can harvest and sell his grain in peace, and it would not
occur to him that the manner ·o f government could affect the price of
grain. He knows that he can deal with his neighbors without a government. Only when men fighting for political control rob his farmyard, conscript his sons, and ruin his fields is he disturbed. Until
the robbers reach his land he watches serenely the coming and going
of governments. He feels no need, neither he nor his ancestors has
ever felt the need of government. And China is so vast a continent
that she can support a dozen local civil wars and still leave most of
6

her population to toil in peace, undisturbed by rackets and roars
which often loom larger in the pages of the New York and Paris
newspapers than they do in the village life of the bulk of China.
It is possible to paint a ghastly picture of the chaos in China
today---and it too will be true. The "Peking Government" is a farce
-its writ does not run beyond the walls of the capital, and even
within the city the military men defy its orders and collect illegal
taxes despite its feeble protests. Chang Tso-lin and his satraps rule
Manchuria, Shantung, and Chihli Province, within which the capital
lies. Feng Yu-hsiang's lieutenants hold the Northwest territories as
an independent nation. Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fong, recently
great semi-independent rulers, have been reduced to impotence; the
Cantonese Nationalist Government gives not even lip-allegiance to
Peking, and boldly proclaims itself the true Government of all China;
Szechuan in the West is divided between several rival forces; and in
far-away Yunnan a local potentate rules almost unconscious of any
outer influence except that exerted from the south by France. All
the tuchuns and tupans are more or less continuously at war with
one another, in variously shifting combinations.
This civil war in China, while relatively courteous-the forces
fighting in North China, for instance, frequently declare a temporary armistice during a particularly bitter spell of cold weatherlevies a deadly toll on the working population. They pay in taxes,
sometimes collected by force f·o r years in advance, in lost work, and
in higher prices. Two years of civil war raised the Peking price of
millet and kaffir corn (grains much used by the work-people in North
Ohina) to an extent which, it is estimated, meant an increased cost
of . living for a working-class family of $4.50 (gold) a month-an
appalling sum in a country where many people earn no more than
that. The loss of commerce in North China alone in the sixteen
months of civil war ending with December, 1925, amounted to nearly
$400,000,000-more than the entire cost of construction of all China's
five thousand-odd miles of railways.
Shantung's military governor frequently commandeers every
freight car in the province for troop movements, leaving not one for
commerce-and even in peace times none is available except by payment of an extra "squeeze" of $50 per car. For months the BritishAmerican Tobacco Company moved its goods by ox-cart from Tientsin
to Peking, over a bad dirt road which parallels a good railway linebecause the military had other uses for the freight cars. National
universities are months in arrears on faculty salaries.
One could continue this recital of chaos and calamity almost indefinitely. But China is for the most part organized on a medieval
village economy which enables her to withstand buffets which would
destroy a more developed nation. She suffers most where the foreign7

built railways and foreign machinery have upset the · old economy
and made the country dependent on the cities and their trade. There
is no railroad from Canton to Central and North China, and Canton
Province-which is itself a nation with more inhabitants than Great
Britain or France--can suffer wholesale civil war without affecting
other provinces at all. Fighting in North China leaves Shanghai
almost undisturbed, and a war in Kiangsu hardly ruffles Peking. Ten
miles off t}:J.e lines of march of contending armies the peasants plow
their fields and tend their cabbages in peace.
Even the most modern industrial centers have a local vitality
that amazes one accustomed to the intricate interdependence of our
Western economic structures. Whenever Canton gets a six months'
respite from local wars she begins to tear down houses in her picturesque narrow lanes and substitute wide modern avenues, to build
more horse roads, to prolong the roads into the country, to develop· a
system of Ford buses; far-away Chengtu in war-ridden Szechuan
does likewise; Hangchow, near Shanghai, has transformed itself during a period of civil wars. All over China local communities are building roads, installing electric-light plants, t elephone systems, fire companies, even sprinkling carts. Canton, in the midst of civil war and
r evolution, is in 1927 installing a complete, automatic dial-telephone
system, made in the U. S. of A. While civil war obscures the newspaper
horizons the industrial revolution quietly takes its course. Power
looms are installed; the small-home unit of production gives way to
larger units; sweatshops, small factories, large factories develop like
mushrooms. In the same months in which the North China railways,
due to civil war, lost $400,000,000 in trade, the number of Chineseowned cotton mills in all China (mostly about Shanghai and Tsingtao)
jumped from fifty-four to sixty-nine, the number of looms from 8,500
to 16,400, and the number of spindles from a million and a half to
almost two million.
China is not a modern nation; she is a civilization, a continent
bursting out of the Middle Ages. Each of her twenty-one provinces
is bigger than most European nations. Canton alone-although the
cusooms receipts are still sent away to pay interest on the foreign loans
~has a normal monthly revenue larger than that of many European
nations. And a continent can survive civil wars as a nation cannot.
The Thirty Years' War devastated Germany, but France and Italy
attended to their own business relatively undisturbed.

8
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Americanization?

WO or three Greek temples, a few structures with traces of Gothic
inspiration, and a miscellany of imitation warehouses and factory-buildings stand on the campus of the Chinese government university in Nanking-an architectural hodgepodge worthy of an American
State university. Half a mile away are a group of magnificent buildings with heavy black overhanging roofs curling skyward at the corners, carved banisters, and richly painted paneled ceilings, redolent of
<>ld China. They are the lovely Asiatic shell of a Christian mission
college founded and supported by American Methodists.
That is typical. In fifty years the great port cities of China will
have left hardly a trace of the lovely old Chinese architecture-except in the mission-college buildings and in the few joss temples which
will doubtless be preserved to gratify the tourist trade. The foreign
mission schools, hurriedly Chinafying themselves to meet the nationalist attack, are spending tens of thousands of dollars in adapting
the old Chinese style to modern requirements. The sweeping green
roofs and gaily painted beams of the Peking Union Medical College,
built with Rockefeller money, are a joy to the eye. Nanking University and Ginling College for women near by are good to look upon.
But in four months in China I saw only one beautiful recent building
which did not owe its existence to foreigners-the Returned Students'
Club in Peking, a remodeled temple; and there the students may be
suspected of having learned abroad their respect for old China.
Shanghai is a great British city, of solid British masonry; Tientsin is as foreign; even Canton, which has providentially escaped the
curse of great foreign settlements, is enormously proud that Chinese
have actually built a ten-story building on its Bund without foreign
aid; and Canton's new buildings are as foreign to China as any suburb
of Cleveland, Ohio, or Birmingham, England. Peking, a capital of
politics rather than of commerce, resists the current most effectively.
You can buy Standard Oil kerosene in any village in China, and
British-American cigarettes. The great corporations behind those
products have in a generation taught the Chinese to change their
habits in order to make them buy-the Standard Oil, indeed, used to
give away lamps in order to create a market for the strange new fuel.
If any third foreign product is on sale in the village it may well be
Wrigley's chewing gum. I saw Spearmint gum on sale in the streets
of Urga, the capital of Mongolia, 700 miles across the Gobi Desert
from the most accessible railroad.
Architecture and chewing gum are outward symptoms of a profound inner change. Western architecture is spreading because it is
cheaper. Gum and tobacco cost less than opium. Only American
9

church-people can afford painted paneled ceilings and bright tile roofs
with gargoyle corner ornaments. The Chinese- like the Europeans,
like the whole world-are abandoning old beauties and old customs
for cheaper and more efficient models. They are becoming modernized, standardized, Americanized, like Japan. Mystery, leisure, charm
are ebbing; cost accounting is defeating tradition.
The cult of the efficient seems a matter of course to most Westerners and almost all Americans, but to the Chinese it is a revolution.
Old "China-hands" will laugh at the suggestion that it has touched
Chinese psychology-but old China-hands need a vacation and a perspective. The Chinese has for untold centuries followed tradition and
has believed that it was wicked to deviate from it. His young men
and young women are beginning to despise custom and tradition; and
his middle-aged business men, almost unconsciously, are beginning to
ignore it. It was only forty years ago that the first railroad tracks
laid in China were torn up by superstitious officials; today they are
an indispensable instrument of civil war, as is the once-despised telegraph. The only opposition to them comes from Westernized Chinese
who know how easily international politics ·slips into an engineering
contract. Once a contract is let, there is no longer much difficulty
about arranging to remove the graves that beset all the short cuts.
And a wanderer through the black lanes of an old Chinese city may
be surprised to discover that the squeaky Chinese music that wails
to the night is produced not by a stringed instrument but by a Victor
record.
Foreign railroads, manners, oil, and architecture are prevailing
because they are more efficient. American wheat, when it costs a
dollar a bushel in Chicago, can be landed in Hankow, ten thousand
miles away and six hundred miles up the Yangtze from Shanghai,
cheaper than it can be brought from Shensi, only a thousand mile.>
away, where it may sell for twenty-five cents. Railways and steamships make the difference; no wonder they and their products are
breaking the crust of old China. Foreign clothes have made less
progress because, in cold weather at least, they are less efficient than
the old Chinese robes. Foreign hair-dressing-including the bobis making its way among the women. Curt foreign manners are replacing the leisurely old Chinese courtesy. The streets are being
widened, and the intimacy of the old Chinese workshop, opening on
a narrow street and aware of all that its neighbors said and did, is
disappearing. Foreign machinery is revolutionizing Chinese industry.
Foreign ideas-and the .r ailway, taking the young people away from
their homes to study and to work-are breaking up the immobile
unity of Chinese family life upon which the whole structure of Confucian ethics is based. Boys go away from home to study, and refuse
to return to the wives of their parents' choice. In the port cities one
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meets sad young men who are homesick for New York, prefer foxtrotting to Mah Jong, and inquire eagerly about the Charleston.
Chinese, with their habit of explaining everything by thousandyear-old parallels, will tell you that there were student revolts in the
Han dynasty, before Christ was born. The nationalism of the student
movement today, however, passionately denouncing foreigners and all
their works, is essentially a part of the cult of Western efficiency.
This political nationalism, this conception of national sovereignty as
a precious right to be cherished and preserved, has its roots in foreign
education and practice-in part in Allied war-time propaganda. The
·old Chinese patriotism-a patriotism profounder than anything known
in the West-was cultural rather than political, inclusive rather than
exclusive. It was a loyalty to a civilization rather than to a state,
conservative rather than aggressive. It was powerless to halt the
intrusion of Western men and methods into the political and economic
control of China, and was satisfied because the Westerners were so
obviously inferior in the refinements of living. The Chinese students
of today belong to our flapper generation; flaunting their posters
and banners, parading by thousands against the unequal treaties, and
making .soap-box speeches about self-determination, they express contempt for the passivity of their elders. Theirs is not the language
of old China but of the young West. When it defies us most violently
young . China is most certainly expressing its determination to be
like us.
And this young China has a significance beyond its years. There
are no middle-aged men in modern China. There are grand old men,
survivals of the old regime; and young men, fresh from Western
education. The old men cannot adapt themselves to the swirling
changes; the young men are forced to act beyon9. their capacities.
"It is unfortunate for men of talent to be born in China today," Hu
Shih said to me once. "They get too far too easily; they are pushed
rapidly to responsibilities beyond their powers-and they are done.
Wellington Koo would have been a splendid permanent under s.e cretary
of the Foreign Office-he becomes prime minister; Wu Pei-fu an excellent division commander-he has to try to be a generalissimo; two
years after I returned from America a newspaper straw ballot declared me one of the twelve greatest living Chinese! When yrou have
made a reputation you have to do one of two things: live up to it or
live on it. In the first case, you are ruined physically; in the second,
you are ruined morally and intellectually. You try to be a great
man; you try to do too many things-and you break."
Boys out of college perforce assume jobs fit for men of mature
years; college students do the work done in the West by men in their
thirties; and mere high-school lads do a task of political agitation
for which we would consider college men unripe·. They do it badly
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enough, but there is no remedy; the twentieth century will not wait,
and the work has to be done. The foreigners, safe in their compounds, complain that the boys are losing their schooling; but the
students know that they are making a new China.
An old Chinese maxim said "Be old while you are young." In
the West, Chen Tu-shu told his Peking students, we say "Stay young
while you are growing old." Chen, like many Chinese, exaggerated
our virtue, but it was a lesson old China needed. Without the
iconoclastic students Sun Yat-sen's long years of revolutionary activity would have been vain; the students poured their souls and tblood
into the Second ReV1olution that seemed to fail in 1913; and it was
the students of Peking who, in 1919, overturned a rotten and corrupt
government, aroused a sodden nation, and forced a surprised delegation
at Paris to refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles which confirmed
Japan-for three short years-in possessi,on of the sacred province
of Shantung. It was a group of just returned students who, in the
preceding two years, had laid the foundations of a greater revolution
by exalting the spoken language of the people, decrying the artificiality
of the old written language of the scholars, thus opening the way for
a great germination of mass education. It was a student demon.:;tration in Shanghai which, silenced for a minute by police-guns, touched
the spark that set the Chinese nati,on aflame in 1925 with a fire which
is still scorching the proud British Empire. It is in the mere children
who leave their classes for what seem futile patriotic parades that
China's hope lies.
An Asiatic scholar, asked how the East could preserve its essential Orientalism while suffering [ndustrialization, replied: "I don't
think there is anything peculiarly Oriental and Occidental. There is
merely medieval and modern." The great force which has maintained
China's identity through fif.ty centuries is her worship of the past, but
the mechanical superiority of the present has already proved its power
to defy that ancient citadel. And as the other civilizations of
antiquity crumbled when their beliefs decayed, so the Qld China is
yielding to the new West. What happens in the port cities of China
today will happen throughout China the day after tomorrow. The
feverish, abnormal life of those cities has a significance out of all
proportion to their share of China's four hundred million people; the
rest of China too will adopt the Western-or modern-method of working hectically while it works, and of playing madly while it plays; it
too will forget the Chines~r medieval-knack of combining work
and play so that long hours seem short. The port cities are a hint of
China's tomorrow.
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IV

The Missionaries

Y

OU see a blank high wall breaking the monotony of the swarming close-built Chinese street; you enter a gate, and suddenly
find )~~Ourself in a miniature Main Street. There are the square-set
homely houses, the amp,le porches, the trees and green lawns, the comfortable space and leisureliness of Any Town in the U. S. A. There
are romping white children in relatively clean, neatly darned clothes,;
the familiar smells of American food float out of the kitchen windows. It is the missionary compound. Large and small, there must
be a thousand of them scattered through the cities and villages of
China. They are the centers of the greatea,t foreign propaganda
scheme in history; neither George Creel nor the Bolsheviks ever, in
numbers, in money spent, or in system and method, approached them.
There are some 8,000 missionaries in China, and of theae more
than half are Americans. An extraordinary missionary atlas entitled
"The Christian Occupation of China," which in a series of graphic
charts portrays the invasion of this alien group, reports that whereas
in 1907 37 per cent of the foreign miss,i onaries in China were
American and 52 per cent British, by 1922 the proportions had been
precisely reversed. This Americanizing tendency is increasing, because America is now spending ten million dollars annually on mission
work in China, and no other country can afford a tithe of that sum.
Even the Catholic missions are passing from French to American
control. Increasingly, the missionary invasion of China is an American campaign, conducted by Americans, with American method.> of
statistical efficiency, gymnasium camouflage, mass-advertising propaganda, and Rotary Club enthusiasm. Some two and a half million
Chinese now call themselves Christians'; more than 200,000 children
daily attend the 7,000 Christian missionary schools, while 2,000 young
men and women are in Christian colleges; and the 330 Christian
hospitals with their 18,000 beds form the bulk of the decent hospital
facilities of China.
Now, I have never liked missionaries. My Unitarian-Quaker upbringing predisposed me against the militant conquest of souls, and
I grew up increasingly skeptical of all those things of wl ich a
Christian missionary shvuld feel most sure. It seemed to me that
all religions were attempts from various angles to scale a mountain
which reaches beyond the capacity of the human mind and that they
fill in the unknown and unknowable with more or less satisfactory
legends; that the function of the missionaries waa to supplant native
superstitions with unnatural alien superstitions, paving the way for
the denationalization of their victims. Certainly I have never felt
that more vividly than when I watched an enthusiastic Minnesotan
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teaching patient Chinese boys to sing a hymn-which they could not
possibly understand-about the "blood of the lamb"; or when I sat
through a colorless church service in Chinese in a bare little barn of
an American mission church stolidly planted in a colorful Oriental
city.
But .
What are the missionaries there for? · The radicals of China say
they are making the way easy for the imperialist-conquerors; the Russians regard them as propagandists for capitalism; the foreign business men say that the missionaries are just stirring up trouble,
putting fool ideas into Chinese heads; the old-fashioned circuitriding missionary says they are there to preach the word of Jesus
Christ; and the younger generation talk in terms of sanitation,
modern schools, improved agriculture, and social work.
In their way all are right. China has missionaries of every
description, from the devout Inland Mission workers who used to wear
queues and still go about in Chinese costume, living on the rice diet of
their congregations, the passionate fundamentalists who preach
Christianity exactly as they learned it in tight little American villages,
foreign patriots who identify their religion with their nationality, to
medical workers who have forgotten creed in healing, teachers who are
so absorbed in China that they remember America only when they
have to ask for funds, c<>mmunity leaders who belong to the race of
Jane Addams and Lillian Wald, and thinkers who have climbed to
heights beyond the walls of any single religion. They are all there,
and on the whole they are considerably more liberal-minded than the
people who support them at home.
These red-hot years have taught the missionaries things about
themselves that they had never known, forced movements that had
been long in germination to bloom early. New buds. appeared upon
the branches which the gardeners •at home had never suspected were
there. Every anti-foreign outbreak seems to work changes in the missionary garden. "Rice Christians" who join the churches for what they
can get out of it dvop away; and the missionaries learn in blinding
flashes what parts of their work have sunk into Chinese hearts and
what have not. Some of them suddenly realize how far they have
moved since they left home, how much more they care for China than
for any form or m-eed. Others return to tamer tasks.
Historically, of course, the radicals are right. The stain of blood
and lawlessness lies on the missions in China. The first American
missionaries went to China as the illegal guests of a trading firm;
and missionaries helped draft, after the First Opium War, the treaty
that established extraterritoriality and gave mission work its treaty
basis. Nor did those early apostles heed the treaty terms; long before
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the Second Opium War forced new concessions from China they made
their dangerous way into f<>rbidden cities. As recently as 1897 the
death of two missionaries was used as an excuse for the great international grab game in which Germany took Tsingtao, Russia Port
Arthur, Great Britain Wei-hai-wei and the Kowloon new territory,
and France Kwang-chow-wan. Today American and other foreign
gunboats penetrate a thousand miles and more into the interior of
China upon the excuse of "protecting missionaries." However many
the missionaries who have come to regret this association of Christianity with the foreign gunboat, it is natural that angry young
nationalists should call the Christian organizations and their officers
the "hawks and hounds of the imperialists"!
Nor are the Russians so far wrong. Inevitably the missionaries
are apostles of the economic system from which they spring. Whether
they are conscious of it or not, they are advance agents of the business men from whom they buy. As one of their defenders put it:
The missionary home in the interior is a demonstration of Western
life with the comforts and all the means the Westerner has used to
give himself comfort. Were the merchant deliberately to make a great
advertising campaign for the purpose of putting up a demonstration
of Western materials in the interior for sales purposes, he could not
put up any better display than the missionary has done gratis.

Naturally the simple coolie identifies the religion of the foreigner
with his higher standard of living, and both with the system of
production whence it arises. Too often the missionary makes the
same mistake.
He is under fire, however, from tb oth sides. The narrow-minded
little business communities of China detest the missionary as much
as does a Bolshevik; indeed they class missionary and Bolshevik together. For the new nationalism is a product of the schools, and
many of the Christian educational leaders have fanned the flames of
discontent. Christian students have been shot down along with nonChristians in almost every one of the bloody clashes of native and
foreigners that dot the recent calendar. Chinese Christian leaders
have sought to prove that they were no whit less patri<>tic than those
who had not been contaminated by f<>reign religions, and many of the
Western Christians in China have openly voiced their sympathy with
the patriotic movement. Christian schools have celebr~ted the
national days of mourning and have officially participated in the huge
patriotic demonstrations. An increasing group of missionaries has
boldly entered the forbidden sphere of politics and insisted that the
spirit of Christianity requires abolition of the "unequal treaties."
In the missionary body itself the debate has been hot and heavy.
The missionary press reveals a pr<>found ferment, a passion to justify
faith by works. These men and women have seen their own converts
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and Chinese colleagues watching them with doubt and distrust in their
eyes.
I have read scores of resolutions and hundreds of letters from
missionaries all over China, and while there is many a voice to say,
"Business enterprises would suffer most from abolition and we are
dependent upon business men for a very large part of the means with
which we carry on our work," a commoner opinion is that "More is
to be gained by letting it be known that we are preaching our gospel
with no dependence upon gunboats or laws which give us special
favors."
Dependence upon gunboats and treaties was only one symptom of
the alien arrogance of the old missionaries. They believed it their
duty to impose Christianity, with all it.;;. Western forms, on China.
They never stopped to question whether, man for man, we Western
Christians were superior to the Chinese. The Christian schools began
as Western schools, taught by Westerners, largely as bait for converts.
But increasingly they have focused on education as an end in itself
rather than upon conversion, and the junior schools have been going
under Chinese control; in these last years of ferment the colleges too
have had to look for advice and leadership to their Chinese faculties.
The change has brought some unlooked-for results. Two years
ago daily chapel attendance was comp.ulsory at virtually every
Christian school in China; so were courses in religion. Today nearly
half the higher schools have made both voluntary, and another year
will see a change in the majority. The Government requires registered schools to eliminate compulsory religious instruction, to have
a Chinese president or vice-president, and Chinese majority on the
board of control, and to declare that the propagation of religion is
not its purpose. The Chinese-faculty and student, Christian and
non-Christian-want registration, which opens the roa:d to government jobs for the graduates·; and the foreign teachers, sometimes
reluctantly, are following their lead. "It would be un-Christian for a
school in China not to do willingly what the Government would enforce
if it could," says the president ·o f Yenching University in Peking.
And what modern government would permit a corps of aliens, teaching largely in a foreign language, propagating a foreign religion, to
dominate its school system? The missionaries begin to see that soon
they may not be permitted to give even voluntary courses in religion.
"But we can make our education Christian by the spirit in which
we conduct it even if we are forbidden to give any direct Christian
teaching," said President Burton. Schools like Lingnan University
at Canton are doing that.
Slowly and impressively China gathers into herself the men and
women who work there and stamps them with its own ancient civilization. I once argued for hours with an old missionary vainly trying
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to find some virtue in the Christian teaching for which he could
produce no parallel from the Chinese classics. Missionaries who study
Chinese thought acquire something of its tolerant eclecticism. The
Chinese have never fought religious wars and cannot understand our
emphasis on doctrines, our conviction that religions must ibe mutually
exclusive. Our little sects mean nothing to them; if they accept
Christianity they but add it to minds already deeply molded by
Confucian, Taoist, and Buddhist teaching.
The ·old type of missionary who refused to show distrust in God
by being vaccinated (the smallpox rate among missionaries in China
is one hundred times that in the United States, and the typhoid rate
is thirty-three times that of the American army) is fading into the
hinterland. The new typ,e is an emissary of athletic sports, of hygiene,
of schools, of mechanics-needed in China, although incorrigibly
alien. Even he may find his role declining; as in Japan, the number
of foreign missionaries will fall, and the Christian church in China,
if it continues at all, will have to represent a kind of Christianity as
much modified by Oriental habits as what we call Christianity has
been modiped, in two thousand years, by our Western history. The
permanent service of the missionaries is likely to be less in the
religious field than as a bridge between two civilizations that had lost
contact with each other. In the early days the missionaries forced
contacts where they were not wanted; but they may somewhat lessen
the frictions of tomorrow. Bringing science to the East as a gift of
God rather than as an efficient aid to lower production costs, the
missionaries may soften the harsh process of adaptation to the industrial West, and ease the break-up of the ancient family system
which is an inevitable part of that inevitable process. Romantic
lovers of the past will deplore that necessity; but history marches
roughshod over romance.
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China: The World's Proletariat
N China the economic and nationalist struggles are inextricably

I intertwined. For China has the greatest cheap-labor supply on
earth. It is good labor, too-and European capital, which at first

merely bought native products cheap, has for two or three decades
been attempting to instal Western factories with Western methods to
make Western products with the labor of China. When New England
passed anti-child labor laws it exported its low child-size machines
to China as well as to our own South, and the little girls of China
are today competing with the children of our South Atlantic States.
And in China this whole industrial system, whether the immediate
employer be a Chinese or a foreigner, is rightly regarded as a Western
importation.
The mills have sprouted like mushrooms along the coast and
rivers of China. The first cotton mill came to China in 1890; there
were 14 in 1906, with 400,000 spindles; 42, with 1,154,000 spindles,
in 1916; 83, with 2,666,000 spindles, in 1923; and there is no reason
to suppose that the number will not continue to double every six or
seven years. China still imports the blue cotton cloth which has
become the national uniform of her masses-a fantastic statistician
once figured that China's annual consumption of cotton cloth would
pave a roadway sixty feet wide to the moon. And the workers in
these mills live in a manner that would shame a self-respecting pig.
All about the industrial outskirts of the great Western city which
is the pride of the foreigners in Shanghai one may see the disreputable sheds, built of bamboo, mud, lime, and straw. Six or eight
people live in one-room floorless huts, through whose flimsy roofs the
rain leaks in a storm; whose walls, falling or riddled with holes, afford no privacy. There is no drainage, no lavatories; garbage-heaps
and cess-pools-or rather cess-puddles-surround the hovels. A big
rain often floods the whole neighborhood, and the ragged babies wade
about coated with mud and filth. In smaller cities, where the concentration is not so great or so sudden, conditions are somewhat
decenter. But while a few enlightened Chinese talk of decentralization, the factory owners continue to build their prisons in the overcrowded centers where they can be sure of coal and raw materialsTienstin, Tsingtao,· Shanghai, Hangchow, Wusih, Hankow, and the
rest.
Wages are desperately low. They can best be understood when
translated into goods. A Shanghai cotton-mill worker would have
to work two weeks to buy a hat; longer to buy a pair of leather shoes.
A pair of sheets would cost a month's wages, an overcoat three
months' toil; a daily paper one-tenth of the daily income; a ton of
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coal four months' earnings. Of course these industrial workers do not
use coal, wear hats or shoes or overcoats, or buy newspapers-they
live on a lower level. And yet these wages seem high to Chinese
of the coolie type; there is no dearth of labor. It flocks in from the
country, constantly replenishing the worn-out supply, for the working
life of a Chinese mill-hand is generously estimated at from two to
eight years.
In the cotton mills and silk filatures (where silk is reeled from
cocoons which bob up and down in basins of boiling water) the vast
majority of the workers are women and children. Men complain that
they are discriminated against in Shanghai, which is true, largely
because they are more likely to form labor unions and strike. The
Shanghai Child Labor Commission found in 1923-1924 that of 154,000
workers in the mills it studied more than 86,000 were women and
more than 22,000 were children under 12. (It is worth while noting
that in the Japanese-owned mills of Shanghai only 5.5 per cent of the
workers were children under 12, and in the Chinese only 13 per cent;
while the British mills had nearly 18 per cent children and the French
and Italian 46 per cent. The few American mills had a slightly lower
percentage than the Chinese.) In the silk filatures of South China
nearly all the workers are women and girls. Often the children are
brought in from the country by a contractor, who follows disaster like
vultures and pays starving parents about a dollar a month for a
contract which amounts to slavery; the girls live for years in his
compound, eating his food, or in the factories, eating factory rice,
working sometimes fifteen or sixteen hours a day, and often sleeping
on the floor beneath their machines.
It is the common excuse of the mill-owner that the mothers do not
want to leave their children unguarded at home, and doubtless that is
sometimes true. Walking through these dimly lit mill-rooms one sees
baskets containing children, ·s leeping or awake, between the whirring,
clacking machines. Sometimes a tot of two or three sits cheerfully
playing with cotton waste in the aisles through which the foreman
guides the visitor. Girls a little older help their mothers tend the
rows of spindles, and the deftness of five-year-old fingers is amazing.
But when I asked ages of children smaller than my seven-year-old
son, the foreman always replied monotonously "twelve." Except in
the Japanese mills little attempt is made to keep the children out of
the mills; there a rigid standard of height is set, and maintained.
Native-owned mills are likely to be dirtier and more dangerous
than foreign-owned. The machinery is seldom protected, the ventilation is atrocious, the crowding terrific. But even a foreigner can
sense the more human atmosphere. In the Naigaiwata mills (Japanese-owned) of Shanghai, where the great 1925 strike began, wages
are ~air; hours relatively short (only 10% ! ) , and all sorts of modern
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welfare-devices have been installed. But the girls stopped talking
and kept their eyes rigidly on their machines when the foreman appeared and the foreign visitors passed by. In a far dingier Chinese
mill the girls showed no fear of the foreman, and pointed and giggled
at the ridiculously garbed aliens who marched through the aisles.
One of the demands of the strikers last summer was that foremen
should no longer be armed, and the demand was typical Qf the spirit
of the efficient, clean, militaristic Japanese mill.
There are vast profits to be made in these early stages of Chinese
industri·a lization. But I doubt if the white men are to have as large
a share in it as they expected. There are fewer British cotton mills
in China today than there were three years ago, and there are no
American cotton mills. Even the Japanese, who ·so proudly identify
themselves in China with the imperialist West, are feeling the pinch
of native competition that is driving the British to the wall. The
great Naigaiwata mills have been on a kind of intermittent strike for
nearly two years-and it is a safe guess that the strikes are fomented
and financed rather by Chinese competitors than by the commonly
blamed Russians.
The Chinese employer straddles the class issue. He does not yet
identify himself with the employing class Qf the world. Recently he
has openly encouraged the working class to fight for him the national
battle against his foreign competitors. The Shanghai strike of 1925
was directed and subsidized by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce;
the Canton boycott of Hongkong in 1925-1926 was largely financed by
Chinese business men in other parts of China and by the prosperous
Chinese community of Singapore in the Straits Settlements. And not
unprofitably. In South China the native N anyang Brothers thus won
a monopoly of the vast cigarette business, at the expense of the BritishAmerican TQbacco Co., which outstrips them in the North. I shall
not soon forget the enthusiasm with which a rich Chinese banker described the Naigaiwata strikes, and CQntinued: "We have waked up.
We see now how the foreigners have run China, and we ·a re planning
to change things. For instance, the British have a monopoly of
Yangtze River shipping. Well, we may not be as efficient mariners as
they, but I think we can find ways of making it very hard for them
to do business at all."
If the employer has no clear-cut sense of class interest, the worker
too is confused. Class consciousness in the Western sense is only
beginning to exist in the treaty ports; but race consciousness takes its
place. In foreign households even the domestic servants-the most
isolated and individualistic of industrial groups-struck in Shanghai
and Canton in 1925; and if the strike was enforced in many instances
by terroristic methods it is still significant that it could be enforced
at all among the scattered individuals of the group. I doubt if the
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domestic servants of Chinese families can be organized for decades to
come, but any kind of strike can be enforced against foreigners.
The labor-union movement in China is less than a decade olninevitably it is younger than the factory movement, although precAdents can be found in the history of the guilds. Shanghai organized
feeble unions in 1916; not until 1919 were labor unions active in
Canton; and the first notably successful industrial strike, that of the
Hongkong mechanics, occurred in 1920. The epic peak of the movement is again in Hongkong, in the amazing seamen's strike of 1922.
Twenty-three thousand Chinese seamen struck, and a few days later
more than a hundred thousand other workers joined them. Hong-
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The daily life of the lower classes-poster from
a Canton wall

kong was paralyzed; the lordly white men had to do their own coolie
work. The police forbade meetings, closed the union headquarters,
deported leaders. But the strike held. After forty days the seamen
won the wage increase they demanded and recognition of their union
-and the police had to restore the union signs which they had torn
from the union building before the workers would return. That was
a year of strikes-in the Pingshiang coal mines and the Hanyang steel
mills, among the Peking school-teachers, the weavers of Changsha, the
wheelbarrow-coolies of a northern city (they wanted their hours reduced from fourteen to twelve), the ricksha coolies of Soochow, in
the Canton silk filatures and matshed factories-all over China. Six
months saw thirty-one strikes in Shanghai alone, involving cotton
mills, silk mills, the municipal electricity plant and water works, the
telephone company, native and foreign tobacco companies, a hospital,
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the comb-makers, joss-paper workers, cargo coolied, sampan-men,
laundrymen, cabinet-makers, and boat-builders. There was a trade
boom that year and most of the strikes were quickly won. Enthusiasts
saw Chinede labor taking its place with the great organized movements
of the West.
But none of these unions had permanent organizations which
would withstand a period of depression. When industries are booming in China new workers flock in from the village,;;; in bad times they
return to their cabbage-fields. Except in Shanghai and perhaps in
some of the mine-fields there is hardly anywhere a permanent working
class. In 1923 Wu Pei-fu smashed the union on the Peking-Hankow
Railway and beheaded the leaders, for which act he was heartily
praised by the foreign presd. A silk workers' strike in Shanghai was
vigorously repressed. The Canton Government encourages the unions;
the Northern militarists, more or less allied with foreign as well as
native busineds men, smash the unions with a ruthlessness hardly
known even in America.
Unrealized, a strange thing has happened. The unions have become the instruments of the new national consciousness. They were
from the first vaguely allied with the radical Kuomintang Party of
the South. Sun Yat-sen more and more leaned on them as his moot
trustworthy supporters. Of course the Russians, wherever they saw
an opening, helped swell the rising protest. Naturally, too, the militaridts of the old regime and the foreigners opposed them. The great
outburst of anti-foreign feeling in 1925, that amazing uprising of
a nation, significantly tbegan with a strike in the Japanese mills of
Tsingtao and the shots which sparked the flame were fired by British
police on strike sympathizers in Shanghai. Chang Tdo-lin, who has
always been supported by the Japanese, closed the offices of the Shanghai General Labor Union that summer, and a few months later, when
the foreign courts of the International Settlement handed over the
chairman of the union, Liu Hwa, to agents of Sun Chuan-fong, who
was more or les,g supported by the Anglo-American group in Shanghai, Liu Hwa disappeared and was believed to have been slain at
night. The militarists naturally and unconsciously align themselves
with foreign capital, and the old compradore type of Chinese merchant works with them. But the young alert busine,gs men, precisely
those who have had their training under foreign conditions, are likely
to join the workers, so intense is their nationalism. If China's militarists are not strong enough to oust the foreigners by force, there is
in the unions a power which can destroy the economic roots of the
foreigner's position.
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VI

Canton-Nest of Nationalism
Canton, February 11, 1926
[This picture of Canton was drawn on the spot in the germinal
days of the movement, before the Northern expedition carried its
spirit across Chirva.]
Peking you will see the past of China; in Shanghai, the present; in Canton, the future," Harry Ward told me before I came to
the East. It is true. Canton is, in a real sense, the pulsing heart of
China which drives the fresh red blood back into the primitive interior
and out into the foreign-ruled treaty ports.
At Swatow, in the north of Canton province, I saw a British
sloop floating silent with her powerful guns trained on the flat city.
She had ammunition enough behind those guns to blow the little onestoried houses to bits and heap their ancient tiles high in the narrow
streets-but she could not make the poverty-stricken people buy British
goods, unload British cargoes, or cook or sew or make beds for British
subjects. All the science and might and money of the British Empire
was helpless before the united national will of those Chinese.
Canton has been pecking at the British Empire for nearly seven
months. Gradually the British Empire has become aware that what
seemed a mosquito has poison in it.;; bite. Hongkong, the greatest
port in the East, is a parasite upon Canton, and when Canton turned
against Hongkong, Hongkong paled. In 1924 Hongkong's harbor
averaged 210 vessels a day. When Canton began to strike against
Hongkong, and the Hongkong Chinese joined, Hongkong's shipping
dropped to 34 vessels a day. Real-estate values shrank; they have
been cut in half. Hundreds of little firms failed. The share values
of the great British banks, the strongest financial institutions in the
East, like the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, dropped more than a
hundred points. In six months British shipping at Canton fell from
nearly three million tons in 1924 to a third of a million in 1925. To
save Hongkong the British Government at London voted a loan of
three million pound.;; sterling. That may not be enough; the strike
is still on. Canton is giving the British Empire a hint of what is
coming if it attempts to cling to what it has stolen from China.
In the dormitory in Canton where a hundred striking tailors from
Hongkong live is a large poster labeled "Crimes of the British in
China," which reads:

''IN

1. Opium smuggling; spreading the opium evil.
2. Seizure of Hongkong; encroachment on Tibet.
3. Establishment, by force, of foreign concessions and settlements;
creation of mixed court.

23

4. The British were the first to force China to recognize foreign
consular jurisdiction.
5. They forced indemnities upon China and seized the customs
control.
6. They fastened upon China a fixed customs tariff detrimental
t o Chinese industry.
7. They oppress the Hongkong and Shameen workers.
8. They shot down the patriotic students and citizens of Shanghai,
Canton, and Hankow.

I cite it as a symptom. Beside it are pasted photographs of the victims of the "Shakee massacre" on June 23, when machine-guns from
th e foreign settlement on the island of Shameen killed fifty-two
Chinese and wounded 117 more.
Shameen itself gives you an eery sense of what a plague-atricken
city must be like. You leave the swarming Chinese street with its
smells and shouts and its teeming crowds of sweating coolies, stumbling under monumental burdens of squealing pigs, squawking hens,
fl opping fish; cabbages, oranges, bean-cake, rice; cloth, metal, stone,
brick; you wind your way through the barbed-wire and i!and-bag
defenses, pass the bearded Sikh guards-and suddenly find yourself
in a world of incredible and amazing peace. Here are shade-trees;
but the grass that was once a smooth lawn has grown high, gone to
seed and withered. A row of dead palms in pots slumbers upon the
consular fence. Barbed wire and sand-bags are everywhere. Your
own footsteps resound alarmingly in the dead silence. Rubbish has
not been collected, ,a nd fallen leaves cover the bricks of a half-finished
building where the Chinese workmen dropped their tools last June.
The British Consul sits alone in his office with nothing whatever to
do these days except to meditate on June 23. Once a day the British
steamer comes up from Hongkong, carrying mail and food for the
exiles on Shameen. It is not allowed to berth at the wharf; it anchors in mid-stream, watched by armed picket-boats of the CantonHongkong Strike Committee, who see to it that no contraband, human
or otherwise, gets ashore. Foreigners may land where they will-the
theory seems to be that without employees they are futile and harmless; Chinese may not go to or come from Hongkong without a permit
from the strikers; and British goodi!, except for use on Shameen, are
contraband.
"I don't see why this strike should not continue until next Christmas," the British Consul said to me. 1 Neither do I, unless a different
type of British official supplants him- a new type capable of considering without a shudder the thought of letting Chinese live on Hongkong's peak and vote for members of Hongkong's council. The Chinese
are learning-particularly in Canton-that by boycott they can hurt
1

It ended shortly before Christmas, after lasting more than a year and a half.
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the proud foreigners more than the foreigners can hurt them. They
still have many scores to settle.
The particular present trouble in Canton dates back to the "Shakee
massacre," which the British call the "attack on Shameen"; and the
Shakee affair had its roots in decades of Chinese history. "They call
us revolutionary!" said one Cantonese. "In our forefathers' day the
foreigners threw Chinese overboard because they burned down the
foreign factories. Now that they've massacred the Chinese we don't
retaliate in blood. Perhaps we ought to." Shameen itself was built
during one of the opium wars, when the British occupied and ruled
Canton. Chinese, to the present day, may not sit on the Shameen
benches, walk along the Shameen bund, or tie their sampans to the
Shameen landing-stages. Until a few years ago Chinese might not
enter Shameen through the same gate as white foreigners. These
things rankle and are remembered. Coolies do not forget when they
are kicked or cuffed. A British officer in Swatow harbor gave an unsympathetic explanation of the boycott there. "The chief Red here,"
he said, "the man that stands on the dock and kicks the British cargoes
out-he used to be No. 1 man at the Taiku Club. Some bloke must
have got tight some night and given him a kick in the rear that he still
rtemembers." The officer thought it a joke; it may have been painfully true. And if Canton is the future of China, it means something.
Englishmen~and some of the treaty-port Americans-call the
Cantonese "Reds." It is a convenient way to discredit an inconvenient group. But the Cantonese are, in certain significant ways,
"Red." The boycott is maintained primarily by a working-class organization rather than by intellectuals and students. These strikers come
from Hongkong and Hongkong and Shanghai are the two centers of
working-class consciousness in China today-two cities governed by the
British and dominated by British cap.ital. The British complain of
Russian propaganda among the Chinese workers, but their own factories and factory methods are doing more to strengthen working-class
consciousness in China than all the propaganda agents Russia could
export in a hundred years. Not the Russians but the British made
this strike. Canton is an interesting study for would-be investors
who like gunboats to accompany their dollars.
Russian influence indubitably exists in Canton. Nearly three
years ago, discouraged with the Westerners, Sun Yat-sen invited Soviet
Russians to help him in the Southern province. Sun had met Adolf
Joffe, the Soviet representative, in January, 1923, at Shanghai, where
after long conversations they issued to the press a joint statement
which is worth recalling: "Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communistic
order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into
China because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is
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entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that
China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national
unification and attain full national independence; and regarding this
great task he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest
sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of
Russia."
In February Dr. Sun returned to become the nominal head of the
aforesaid Canton Government, in which in his own lifetime he held
little real power. In August Borodin arrived, at Dr. Sun's invitation,
and the Russian-Canton collaboration that so alarms the treaty-port
press of China began, on the platform jointly announced by Sun Yatsen and Joffe. The Soviet Government had already announced its
readiness to abolish the unequal treaties in so far as they concerned
Russia; the new alliance sought to force the other Powers to do as
much. In September Dr. Sun asked the diplomatic corps to instruct
the foreign customs official to turn over to his government the customs surplus of Kwangtung Province, as had been done in 1919-1920.
The Powers did not reply. In mid-December he threatened to seize
the custom-houses; the Powers then announced their refusal, and to
support it an international fleet including gunboats flying the British,
American, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Japanese flags appeared
in the river opposite Canton. Nothing could have strengthened the
Russian position more. On December 31 Dr. Sun-who a few years
before had been pleading with the Western Powers to invest more
capital in China-said in a speech at the Canton Y. M. C. A.: "We
no longer look to the West. Our faces are turned toward Russia."
Today there are thirty or forty Russians in the service of the Canton
Government. Most of them are aides to Chiang Kai-shek at the
Whampoa Military Academy; one is adviser to the Canton navy;
one is helping revise the chaotic system of multifarious taxation.
"They've been a force for honesty and efficiency," said a responsible
American in Canton. "The trouble is, they are Russians. If they
were British or Americans we would not object." I did not find one
American or Englishman in Canton who had ever met or tried to meet
Borodin or had taken the trouble to attempt to verify any of the
wild stories they told about him.
Michael Borodin is a big, strong, black-mustached Russian with
a hearty hand-grasp, a deep, serious voice, and a warming smile.
He has no authority, officially ; he gives no orders; · yet many think
him the most powerful man in the province. There are no Russian
warships to back Borodin; there is not even a large Russian trade
interest in Canton. In fact, there have not been twenty thousand
tons of Russian shipping in the Pearl River since Borodin arrived
a year and a half ago. Borodin has won his influence over the group
of men who govern Canton, to whom he cannot speak in their own
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language, by the proved value of his advice and the power of his
personality.
The young men who are governing Canton turn to him for advice;
they believe that his counsel has proved disinterested and good.
"We have no fear of Russia in South China," said C. C. Wu, the mayor
of Canton, who is regarded as a moderate. "Why should we? She
has no trade interests· here, and no surplus capital to invest. She
hoo renounced all special privileges, and has no dang.e rous friends; all
the imperialist nations are her enemies. It is to her interest today
to have China stron~, united, and independent-not a tool which, the
West can turn against her. That is our interest too. Communism
is impossible in China today; it need not even be feared. Ten years
hence, when the unequal treaties are abolished, who knows? We may
fight Russia then; today, we help each other."
Sun Yat-sen trusted Russia and trusted Borodin-thart is enough
for most of the Cantonese, who venerate their dead leader as the
Russians venerate Lenin. "Chung Shan's" picture-they call him
"Middle Mountain"-has the place of honor in every hall in Canton;
one would not be surprised to see lighted candles and joss-sticks burning before it. Chiang Kai-shek, the general in charge of the Whampoa army, is the only one of the Canton leaders who ha'S ever been to
Moscow-and the foreigners, with that curiQUS faith in military men
which seems universal among Western exiles in the East, look to him
as a possible counterbalance to the Russians. He himself boasts not
of his military victories but of his long devotion to Sun Yat-sen. The
Chinese will not speak ill of the Russians. ·Wang Ching-wei, the rosycheeked, enthusiastic, boyish chief of the Government, has a respect
for Borodin which is the more striking because Borodin has to talk
to Wang through an interprete•r . T. V. Soong, the young Harvard
graduate who is Minister of Finance and manager of the government
bank, turns naturally to him, and Borodin calls Soong "a man in a
million." The new president of Kwangtung University is planning to
send two hundred and fifty Cantonese boys and girls (another of Canton's futuristic ideas is that women may amount to something too)
to Moscow each year; he thinks a year in Russia will help them more
than his own years at Columbia helped him. "Russia's problems are
more like China's," he says.
Borodin himself does not think highly of the training given
Chinese students in America. "They lose touch with China," he said.
"Go to the Commercial Pre'Ss in Shanghai-it is the work of returned
students. Ask for a book on the agrarian situation in China. They
haven't got it. Ask for a book on labor conditions. None exists. But
they have translations of lives of George Washington and Abraham
Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. That's what
the returned students do; they translate America into Chinese."
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VII

The Canton General

'f HEas afirstChinese
and most extraordinary thing about Chiang Kai-shek,
military leader, is that he would refuse to accept
any interpretation of his successes in terms of his own character.
He represents a party, and his Kuomintang soldiers, tvained in a
school of politics as well as in a miHtary academy, are like nothinll
else in China. When I asked him what he thought of Feng Yu-hsianl!'.
the Christian general whose Northwestern army flirts with the nationalists in the South, he answered: "You cannot tell anything about
an army by looking at its general. You must look into it, and see what
kind of men makes up the ranks." I doubt whether such an answer
would have occurred to any other of China's thousand generals.
If you go to see Chang Tso-lin, the war lord of Manchuria and
Peking, he will receive you like a king, dressed in fine robes, in a
throne room hung with tiger skins; Wu Pei-fu affects the part of the
genial classical scholar (always a sympathetic role in China) and lives
surrounded by friends and underlings. Sun Chuan-fong used to receive visitors in a magnificent yamen in Nanking with bugles blowing.
Six lines of soldiers were drawn up at salute to greet us when, with
the American Consul, I called on Sun, and all was pomp and cevemony.
When I went to see Chiang Kai-shek in Canton I presented my card
at the door of an inconspicuous two-story modern dwelling house;
the boy studied it and silently pointed ups,t airs. At the top of the
stairs I met a pleasant-looking young man in an officer's uniform
without distinguishing marks of rank.
"Where Chiang Kai-shek ?" I asked in simplified English.
"Yes, Chiang Kai-shek," the young man replied.
"Where, where Chi•ang Kai-shek ?" I repeated, puzzled.
The young man pointed to a bedroom; I entered and sat down.
A moment later Chen T:m-yen, a former Lehigh University student,
came in and explained that the pleasant young officer was the Commander-in-Chief himself. The bare bedroom was his; it was also his
workroom. The inevitable tea appeared, also a plate of hard candies,
and another of exceedingly stale rice cakes. The general ate nothing,
and instead of tea he sipped hot water. Most of the time he sat
erect, his folded hands on the table before him. There was no bombast about him, hardly any gesture, but he had a quiet dignity, anda quality rare in Chinese, rare enough anywhere--he smiled as he
spoke. A tall, slight man under 40, there was nothing in his appearance to mark him as a leader of men; his high forehead, which seemed
higher because of his close-cropped head, his delicate features, and
small-boned hands seemed rather to indicate the scholar-type.
I asked him, when we began our interview, for a short autobiog28

raphy, and he wrote it out as the interpreter translated his remarks
into English. But it looked very brief in Chinese characters, and the
interpreter reduced it to this simple chronicle: "Born in Chekiang
Province, educated at Paotingfu Military Academy and in Japan, with
Sun Yat-sen since the revolution." Later I gleaned a few facts to
fill the chinks. He was born in 1888 in a tiny village near Feng-wha;
his father died when he was a baby, and his mother brought him up
~:unong her relatives, who were Ningpo tradesmen.
In 1906 he won
one of the forty Chekiang scholarships to the new national military
academy, where the decaying Manchu dynasty was trying, too late,
to build a modern Western-style -army. A year later his instructor.>
sent him on to study further in Japan. Those were the days, just
after the Russo-Japanese War, when thousands of Chinese crossed the
Yellow Sea to study in Nippon; they still counted the Mikado's people
as brothers, of their own race.
The revolution of 1911 called him home, with others of China's
young enthusiasts. The republic gave him command of a brigade of
Shanghai troops, and for a time he drilled them conscientiously. But .
he lost interest, and for two years he lived the life of ·a typical oldstyle Chinese officer. He drank, he gamed, he frequented sing-song
houses; sometimes he would be away for ~eks. Thos~ were disillusioning days for ardent young men; Yuan Shih-kai was molding
the republic into something very like a new monarchy. Leader of
vain revolutionary movements for decades, Sun Yat-sen, Yuan's predecessor in the presidency, raised the standard of revolt in 1913; Chiang
joined him, and ever since his destinies have been intimately linked
with those of the "father of the republic."
For ten years he was. a minor officer-his only outstanding
achievement being a venture in speculative exchange, which, according
to the stories, netted him a million dollars, all of which he turned
over to Dr. Sun. Finally, in 1923, Dr. Sun appointed him head of the
new Whampoa Military Academy, across the river from Canton.
Out of Whampoa has grown Canton's national success. With the
aid of General Gallant (one of Borodin's assistants) and a small subsidy Chiang trained a corps of boys to be officers in China's future
nati•o nalist army. · He insisted upon boys-no one over 25 need apply.
And he built up a corps of lads ready to die for China and Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kai-shek. He trained them to shoot straight and to
goose-step. And he also drilled them in the "Three People's Principles" which are the basis o~ what, since the leader's death, has become
known as Sun Yat-senism.
The Three Principles are variously translated. The Mayor of
Canton, son of old Wu Ting-fang, so long the Chinese Minister to
Washington, says they mean government of, by, and for the people.
Others define them as nationalism, democracy, and socialism. But
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China is a long, long way from democracy or socialism today, andessentially they are understood as the expression of the democratic
nationalist movement which has so stirred the youth of China.
Chiang Kai-shek's name first floated into familiarity in the treaty
ports of the North last year when he routed Chiung Ching-ming, who
had long hE;ld the northern half of Canton Province, and forced him
to flee on a warship. While in the North he discovered a conspiracy
in his capital. His little force :abandoned the cities they had just
won, turned homeward, and routed the mercenaries who had taken
possession of Canton in their absence, then retraced their steps and
in another brilliant campaign defeated Chen Chiung-ming a second
time, storming Waichow, a walled and fortified city which had never
been captured by storm since the T'ang Dynasty, a thousand ye111rs
before.
Chiang's Dare-to-Die Corps dashed single file through a narrow
opening in the face of machine-gun fire, leaving hundreds behind but
capturing the town. Military science in China is a game like chess,
and the players usually obey the rules; Chiang defied the rules, outraging his adversaries but winning the day. And since then he has
amazed his enemies by his successive capture <>f Hankow, Wuchang,
Kiukiang, and Hangchow.
Chiang is a moody, tempestuous soul. He has proved himself
as an administrator, but his nerves fray. Every few months he is
likely to vanish from Whampoa, and rest his soul in some Buddhist
retreat in the mountains. But for six months after storming Waichow he devoted himself to building up an officers' corps for Canton's armies. There were relics of a dozen mercenary bands in the
province, nominally loyal to the Kuomint~ng Party Government which
Chiang had helped instal, but really loyal only to the leaders who paid
them. Chiang filtered his Whampoa cadets into these armies, and
sent civilian missionaries of Sun Yat-senism to preach the nationalist
goapel. Most Chinese troops, when captured, turn about and fight
for their conquerors; Chiang, until the too successful Northern expedition, refused to incorporate such units and boasted that his own soldiers were so indoctrinated that if any of them were captured they
would, instead of fighting for their adversaries, set about converting
them.
At any rate, Chiang's Whampoa-trained troops have walked
through every army with which they have come in contact, and have
won a reputation as men who are not afraid of fighting against odds.
With half China already under their flag, and with sympathetic party
units hoping for their advent in every city of the country, they and
their leaders are a force to be reckoned with.
"What do the Russians actually do here?" I asked Chiang Kai-shek.
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He smiled, but all he said was, "We employ some of them to help
in technical training of various kinds."
Later, he added: "Ours is part of a world revolution, and we can
use people from any nation if they sympathize with and are ready to
serve our nation. Russia, in general, has treated China better than
the other nations. She has given up extraterritoriality, renounced
territorial ambitions, and canceled her unequal treaties, and we like
the Russians who have been here at Canton."
"What do you look forward to?" I asked him. "What will be the
outcome of this Canton movement?"
"We will join with the Kuomintang members in other provinces
and unite China," he answered briskly.
"That's a large order," I said.
"Yes, but we'll do it," came the reply. "We may not need to
fight much; we will organize. Perhaps within a year we shall start
our Northern expedition, for the Kuomintang is strong on the Yangtze
River and we have many calls for help."
It seemed an impossibly rosy picture then, but Chiang has
accomplished more than he predicted.
"What then?" I said.
"We will cancel the unequal treaties and set China free."
I raised my eyebrows.
"It will not be difficult," he went on. "In one, two, at most three,
years it will be done."
"What do you mean by the 'unequal treaties'?" I persisted. "Do
you expect to recover rule of Shanghai and get Hongkong back from
Great Britain?"
He waved me aside. "Those are political questions; they will
settle themselves when China is unified. Unity is our first job. Extraterritoriality and cu.stoms control will, of course, go before we
recover Hongkong."
And then he began to catechize me keenly about America's attiture toward China and Japan. "Your statesmen talk in a more friendly
way," he said, "but in the end they sign the same treaties as the
British and the Japanese, and we like an attitude of straightforward
opposition better."
Chiang has military ability; he has principles. The question is,
can he cooperate with other men? Will he, alone among China's military chieftains, consent to renounce personal power and turn over his
conquests to civilians?
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VIII

Bolshevism?
ARAKHAN worked from Peking in the North of China; Borodin
in Canton in the South. Karakhan was the Soviet Ambasaador
K
to the Chinese Republic; Borodin is adviser to the Canton Government, holding his appointment from the national congress of the
Kuomintang Party whi.c h dominates Canton; but both were Russian
agents, paid from Moscow, and able, energetic men.
Karakhan is an Armenian, born in Tiflis, Georgia, in 1889; a
revolutionary in his school-days, he was forced to flee to Siberia; in
Harbin he served a prison term in 1910, in Vladivostok in 1912, in
Petrograd in 1915 (for opposition to the war); but he was never outside the borders of Russia until he was named Minister to Poland
in 1921. He reached Peking in September, 1923; in nine months he
had negotiated a treaty with China which made Russia the most
popular foreign nation among the younger generation and himself the
offieial dean of the Dip.lomatic Corps, and in general had created more
stir than most diplomats do in a lifetime. He is a born actor, responsive to his audience, with quick, mobile gestures of his almost
feminine hands. His lips are full; his nose somewhat hooked; his eyes
gleam behind thick octagonal eyeglasses; his hair is already slightly
grayed, 'b ut his pointed beard, shaved to a sharp line on the cheeks,
is thick and brown. Foreigners call him the fountainhead of trouble
in China, with thousands of paid agents among the students and
workers.
"Propaganda?" he said to me one day. "Of course I do propaganda. But I don't have to pay for it. Why should I pay students
at>.d profess·o rs to ·s ay what they want to say anyway? Paid propagandists are never any good; how can a man stir others unless he has
the fire of sincerity in his own breast? I spoke laat week at one of
the universities, and my speech was •all propaganda-and so was your
Silas Strawn's when he spoke at Tsinghua; laat summer, when student delegations flooded Peking, I received them all, fed them just
such tea and cakes as I am offering you, and talked to them. That wag.
propaganda." He chuckled. "It was good propaganda too, especially
when those same students went to your American Legation and were
received by a third assistant under secretary who was obviously in a
hurry to get away from them so that he could play golf. It was
propaganda last week when we lowe·r ed our Embassy flag to half-maat
on the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's death, while no other legation
remembered to honor the first President of China. They are fools,
fools ! They miss their chances-and then they think I have to pay
for my propaganda!"
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What Russia wants in China, ~arakhan said, is "a strong, independent China." "We are the only Power that really supports the
nationalist movement," he insisted. "The others say they want a
strong government, but they r efu se to abandon their unequal-treaty
privileges until China is strong- and of course she never will be strong
until she has thrown overboard those treaties. We have proved our
sincerity by our actions; we have renounced the unequal treaties.
It's not idealism; it's just sense. A strong, independent China will
naturally be our friend. Inevitably she will be against imperialism,
which is everywhere our enemy. She will need foreign capital-she
cannot develop without it-but, like Russia, she will not want to

China bears the burdens of the world-a poster from
a Peking wall
grant special privileges and control to the financial powers that lend
her money. And in that fight Russia is her only possible friend.
The facts fight with us; China's struggle for emancipation brings
her every day closer to us. No wonder they are afraid of us; the
vision of a strong China close to a strong Russia is enough to make
the colonizing Powers shudder. That's why they stick to their
treaties."
(As I look back over my notebooks I find an interview with an
American official on the same day that I talked with Karakhan. Theae
phrases rise to punctuate Karakhan's argument: "The nationalist
wants to deal with theories; we have to deal with facts, and the treaties
exist." "We don't want to wipe out Japanese interests by a too high
customs tariff in China." "The Powers don't want free money to
come into the hands of the present Peking Government; they don't
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trust it." "Sentiment is no use. You can't honestly argue that the
Chinese have any deserts- they have been so absolutely immoral in
their domestic and international relations,. ")
Karakhan scoffed at the idea of sovietizing China. "China is
in a very hopeful stage," he told me. "You may read of civil war in
the newspapers, but colossal historic forces are at work beneath the
surface. And if you want to know what the result will be, look at
Canton."
I had looked at Canton, and seen there the things which cause
the Constitutional Defense League to describe it as "a full-fledged
soviet government." In Canton, for more than a year a Strike Committee had maintained a boycott of British goods; the century-old
foreign hospital h'ad been closed because its employees were not unionized; the foreigners lived on rsufferance, and the students in the missionary schools were currently described as "running-dogs of imperialism." I had seen union headquarters decorated with pictures of Lenin
and Trotzky; walls pasted with lurid anti-foreign posters of obvious
Russian inspiration; Russian officers drilling Chinese cadets, Russian
advisers serving in half a dozen government departments. I knew
that Russia had lent money to the Cantonese to help them build their
army and establish their nationalist government, and I had talked
with Borodin, the tall, dark, slow-spoken Russian who in three years
had won for himself a position of curious authority with the Chinese,
and with the leading "Communists" of Canton.
Tam Ping-san, for instance, who has since made his pilgrimage
to Moscow. Tam is a likable revolutionist who reminds one of Hippolyte Havel, the ,a miable anarchist who used to have the reputation of
being the 'b est cook in Greenwich Village. "Communism is a long
way off," Tam said, "because China is economically so backward.
But the road to communism lies through China's national emanicipation. Our Nationalist movement is to us what the labor movement is
to the West-and it is the working class in the most developed parts
of China which leads the nationalist movement here. For the present
we have to cooperate with the petty bourgeoisie and the militarists.
But it will be a long fight, and in its course class lines will develop.
How the class struggle will work out we cannot yet tell."
Indeed they cannot. I talked long with many so-called Communists-both older men and passionate young students who make
Sun Yat-sen and Lenin their twin gods, and spend their vacations
(often their study months too) touring the country to rouse the villages against the imperialists-and they never seemed more than very
intense and earnest nationalists. Of the struggle against foreign
capitalists they could and would talk in fierce terms; but of class struggle among Chinese they had small conception. I talked too with leaders, both Chinese and foreign, in the well-financed anti-Russian move34

ments which center about the British-owned North China Daily News
of Shanghai, and I was never able to understand the basis for either
fear or hope of communism in China.
Two factors, absent in China, made the Bolshevik revolution in
Russia possible. One was the network of railroads centering in Moscow. The coast regions, accessible to the anti-communist foreign
Powers, dropped away; but Moscow, the railroad center, controlled the
continental mass >Of Russia. China has no railroad centers; its great
cities are all on the coasts, accessible to Western gunboats, and independent of each other. Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, Peking, Mukdeneach can have its own government. With Western Powers in full control of Hongkong, Shanghai, and Dairen, established in Tientsin and
Hankow, patrolling the Yangtze, and 'a dministering one quarter of
Peking, China's unification is more difficult than Russia's.
Furthermore, China has no class-conscious farmers. Its rice-andcabbage peas>antry live close to the starvation line (the average farm
in some regions is under one acre), and doubtless would gladly revolt
if they saw anything to revolt against. The Russian peasant worked
in sight of a landlord who obviously lived in relative luxury; and
when the Bolsheviks, alone among the Russian parties, said "Take the
land" they won the peasants, for the crucial moment, to their support.
But the wealthy Chinese live in the cities, often under foreign protection in the foreign concessions; except, perhaps, in Anhwei, China
has few great landed estates. Wealth is concealed. In the Canton and
Yangtze deltas, to be sure, where the soil is rich 'a nd the market cities
close, land rentals are oppressively high, and wherever water must be
artificially supplied for irrigation-which requires capital-absentee
landlordism, with its attendant evils, enters, and peasant class-consciousness begins. Some of the orthodox Moscow economists, who are
professional prophets of communism, build vast hopes upon this peadant proletariat; but despite the success of the Canton Government in
organizing peasant unions to support it in that province and the spontaneous appearance of peasant self-defense organizations in soldierridden Honan and Shensi, I saw scant reason to ibelieve in their permanence. Peasanto and farmers are the hardest class in the world
to organize-largely because their class enemy is not visible. The
great mass of China Jives on as it has lived for untold centuries, untouched and unaware of the industrial contactil which are revolutionizing the self-conscious port cities. China's revolutions--dynastic,
nationalist, or economic-will receive little either of effective aid >Or
opposition from the peasant massed.
Russia's real contribution to the Chinese revolution is a method
of party organization. The Canton Government, like the Moscow Government, is ruled by the "Political Bureau"-a sort of executive committee-of a political party, which in Canton is Sun Yat-ilen's old Kuo35

mintang, rejuvenated under Russian expert guidance. This party now
has nearly half a million members in all China; it governs Canton,
and has a certain influence in Feng Yu-hsiang's, the "Christian general's," territory. Where it holds power it rules as a party dictatorship-and this comes as near as anything in China today to political
democracy. The attempt to establish a republic on the American model
has been a total failure; nothing is left of it; it had no roots in the
soil, and it washed out. Its last appearance was in the Parliament
which Tsao Kun bribed to elect him President in 1923. All China, with
the partial exception of Canton, is ruled by military dictators, and
even in Canton General Chiang Kai-shek seems to be growing in influence. The Russians, with their technique of party dictatorship,
have provided China with a method by which it may in time grow
beyond personal dictatorships.
Karakhan and Borodin would, I believe, deplore anything like an
attempt at Communist rule in China today, because they want a strong,
friendly neighbor, and realize that chaos in China provides opportunity
for their enemies. They are not averse to stirring up trouble in
regions where European-or Japanese--control is strong. The fantastic stories of thousands of Russian agents circulating about China
are unquestionably fairy tales, but every Chinese radical who wants it
can have sympathy and encouragement at the nearest Russian consulate. Radical leaders in Peking seek the protection of the Russian
Embassy when the political climate becomes unhealthy for them.
Borodin lectures to large audiences on the lessons and methods of
the Russian revolution; and both Canton and the "Christian general" <have had Russian aid in their military operations. But since
traveling by automobile the 1,100 miles across the desert, mountains,
and bridgeless rivers which separate Feng Yu-hsiang's railroad base
f rom the Trans-Siberian Railway I have lost faith in the stories of
immense Russian munition supplies being shipped across Mongolia.
Russia has abandoned her concessions in Hankow and Tientsin;
she is ready for customs autonomy; and as long as Russia and China
are capital-importing countries, they will continue to have a real community of interest in defending themselves against the efforts of the
capital-exporting countries to control them. While the Western Powers stumble along in their present stupid unconceding fashion the
Russians can make hay. Karl Radek, rector of the Sun Yat-sen University, which is giving 400 Chinese boys and girls a Moscow 'education, said to me: "You Americans still have an opportunity to keep the
Chinese revolution in bourgeois channels. You are not tied, like England, to a burdensome past; and you have capital to invest. If you
put yourselves on the side of the national renaissance you can keep
the Chinese revolution bourgeois for twenty years at least-perhaps
more. But I doubt if you will have the sense to do it."
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IX

America in China
OME Americans think of our role in China as that of a guardian
angel, pointing the way to true democracy and assisting China
to struggle along it despite her wicked enemies. The Chinese do not
see things that way. They have had a little sentimentality about
America, but they are beginning to think of us as just one of the rest.
We kept the "open door" in China twenty years ago-but the open
door is not so beatific a vision to Chinese as to us. America wanted
it because it prevented other nations from staking out reserved areas
into which our trade would not be able to grow. We were for it because it was in the interest of our commerce. It helped China at that
time, but it is associated in Chinese minds with the indefensible treaties, to which we are a party, which keep her from shutting the door,
even partially, in the face of all parties. She would like to raise her
customs duties, as the United States and other nations have done, and
protect her home markets, as we do; and we, among others, have
not got around to giving our consent.
We "remitted" part of the Boxer Indemnity in 1908 and more in
1924. It was a good piece of diplomacy. The money has been carefully spent under American auspices in giving Chinese students an
American type of education, and the American-educated "returned students" have vastly increased American influence in China. But the
cynical young Chinese patriots of today say that the indemnity was
an outrage in the first place and that if it was to be remitted it should
have been returned to the Chinese Government without condition, to
be spent exclusively at its direction.
We have given largely to missionary enterprise-which, again,
the young Chinese regard as an effort to de-Ohinafy China.
And we maintain a "Legation Guard" of 450 men in Peking,
another guard of 1,000 men along the Tientsin-Shanhaikwan Railway,
a fleet of river patrols which run a thousand miles up the Yangtze
and six hundred miles into Canton and Kwangsi provinces; we share
through our consul in the administration of the foreign city of Shanghai, the chairman of whose Municipal Council is an American lawyer
from the State of Maine; our consulates in Tientsin, Shanghai, and
Canton are in foreign-ruled quarters, under the protection of foreign
flags; we cling to extraterritoriality (or "extrality"), which gives
Americans in China rights which Chinese do not have; and we are
allied with the Powers in maintaining foreign control of China's
customs.
At the Washington Conference, in 1921, the world was assured,
great things were done for China. A careful reading of the treaties
and resolutions shows rather that they were, so to speak, adumbrated.
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A foreign commission was planned to "inquire" into the state of justice in China, "with a view to reporting" conditions to the foreign
governments and suggesting to China legislation and reforms which
might eventually warrant the Powers in taking steps toward relinquishing extrality. Whioh really did not mean much. A custom.:> conference was· to discuss-not customs autonomy but a 2% per cent
increase in the customs rates. At Washington also Japan promised
to return Shantung and Britain to return Wei~hai-wei, and it should
be noted to the honor of the Japanese that theirs was the only pledge
which has been fulfilled. The British refused to give up Wei-hai-wei
unless allowed special privileges on the golf courses they had built
there! The customs treaty was not even ratified until, three and a
half years •a fter its signature, the outbreak of nationalism in China
stirred the Powers into a semblance of action; and the customs conference broke up as soon as the nationalist movement seemed to sink
out of sight behind the civil war.
Customs and extrality conferences dragged through the weary
winter of 1925-1926 in Peking. The American delegates were pledged
to the pr·inciple of cooperation with the other P·o wers; the official
theory was that America was ready to give almost anything to China
if the other Powers would agree; but that independent action by the
American Government would somehow be most unfortunate-a theory
which condemned us to sterility. The extrality commission met
solemnly, studied the new Chinese law codes (which may be applied
occasionally in modern courts) and found them excellent; visited a
few recently whitewashed prisons, and enjoyed the pleasant cosmopolitan social life of the Legation Quarter. It intended to tour China
in the springtime. Unfortunately civil war cut it off from Shansi,
and Canton's proud Government told it to stay away. So it left
extrality where it found it-which is what it was intended to do.
At the customs conference the Powers rather ludicrously revealed
the nature of their interest in China. The conference began with an
ambiguously worded declaration in favor of tariff autonomy three
years later-a declaration which, however, requires confirmation in a
treaty which was not drawn up, much less ratified. The Powers next
discussed immediate steps to increase the Chinese customs receipts.
A program was worked out to increase the duties sufficiently to develop $90,000,000 of new revenues; but when the proposed increase was
analyzed the surprised Chinese discovered that it meant nothing to
them. Thirty-seven millions were to go to the provinces to compensate for likin and assure its abolition; 30 millions were to be applied
to pay interest on the consolidated debt-in part on the infamoua
Nishihara loans which Japan forced on China in 1918; 10 millions were
to pay interest on the Hukuang and Tsinpu railway bonds, already in
default (it will be recalled that Morgan interests bought up the Ger3~

man rights in the Hukuang railway); and while the remammg 13
millions were at fir st destined for a Chinese government, the Powers
felt doubtful of the wisdom of giving it to any government in China's
state of chaos and decided it mig'ht be wiser to convert it into a
contingent fund, to pay interest on the other railway bonds which
were sure soon to go into default! The conference finally adjourned,
however, without taking even this· action, leaving China stuck with
her ·old ridiculously low customs rate. The Powers had exposed their
self-interest. The British and Americans, desiring to open large-scale
trade with the interior, were most concerned with the abolition of
likin, and also with provision for interest payments on the railway
bonds in which their nat ionals had invested; the Japanese wanted
interest paid on the government debts, but without raising the custom duties, which would interfere with the market for their cheap
goods in China; the Italians, Dutch, and Belgians, having no trade,
but heavy investments, were willing to have the customs raised to the
sky limit if only interest was provided for their railway bonds. Since
then the Powers have let the local militarists assess for their own
benefit a small surtax on the customs, but no one of them has taken
forthright action.
The amiable policy of giving an air of intense activity whenever
the Chinese wax turbulent, and of offer·i ng to do something on condition that the Chinese do something else first, is wearing out. The
Chinese do not accept the quid-pro-quo theory; they want to be free,
even to misgovern themselves, and the nationalistic philosophy of the
West is s·w eeping like a whirlwind across their continent-nation. No
government, however strong its military or foreign financial support,
can stand long against it.
China will not have Western standards of justice for many years
-but more and more she will develop a conscious sense that it is unfair for foreigners to have more privileges than Chinese in China.
Already extrality is fading out in the p.r ovinces; only within range
of foreign warships is it in force. Foreigners increasingly have to
take their chances-like the Chinese. "If you don't like this country
as it is, you can go back where you came from"-that 100 per cent
American slogan is being naturalized in As·ia.
Today the customs rates are determined by foreigners, collected
by foreigners, and largely used by foreigners to pay interest on bad
foreign investments. No wide-awake people would tolerate it, and
demonstrations in a thousand cities prove tlhat the Chinese people,
led by the boy and girl students, is at last awake. From the idealistic
younger generation the new national gospel has spread to a shrewd
older generation. Already the salt revenues, once used to pay the foreign interest, have been seized by local militarists (even at Tientsin,
under the noses of the foreign garrisons), and the customs may soon
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go the same way. The process will discourage foreign investors; but
in the long run the Chinese may gain. They will be better off if bhe
process of industrialization, already fiercely rapid, can be retarded.
The transformation which China is undergoing is so fundamental,
so destructive of her old settled civilization, that at best it will require years of civil war, apparent chaos, bankruptcy, and default.
One of the great transformations of history is occurring in our day,
making our American conquest of a continent seem slow and palsied;
and the process is rapid enough without the stimulation of greedy
foreign capital.
For America in China the choice today is between sympathy and
opposition to that great revolution. Such a choice seems to involve
alliance with Russia or alliance with Britain, and most Americans instinctively choose Britain. The phobia of bolshevism prevents a clear
vision of the momentous issue. China, a people of four hundred millions, is awakening. Shall we align ourselves with the Powers which
are trying to keep her bound by the shackles of her nineteenth-centm·y
weakness? Or shall we join Russia in openly encouraging the effort
of Chinese youth to restore their nation's dignity? If America is to
be regarded as the friend of Asia she should announce now:
1. Intention to withdraw our consulates in China from the
protection of foreign flags, and to retire from participation in
the administration of foreign settlements, concessions, or quarters.
(This, of course, applies particularly to the International Settlement of Shanghai, in whose government we share, and to the
humiliating Legation Quarter of Peking.)
2. Renunciation of extraterritoriality.
3. Withdrawal of ·all United States troops from Chinese soil
and of United States warships from Chinese waters. This would
mean abandonment of the six river ships which we are now
building in China for the Yangtze River patrol.
4. Abrogation, in so far as the United States is concerned,
of the anachronistic clauses of the Boxer protocol which give the
Powers special rights in the Tientsin-Peking area.
5. Recognition by the United States that China has the right
to fix her customs rates without interference by foreign Powers.
We can do these things at once. The stock answer that we have
announced our good will and wait only for a unified government to
emerge in China, is hypocritical. When we wanted to protest against
the Nanking shootings, we found a government to protest to. We can
negotiate as easily.
All the white nations in the East are drifting-and drift is dangerous. If they continue to drift they may wake up some day to discover that their own nationalistic, imperialistic, militaristic philosophy,
absorbed by the East, is at last creating a real Yellow Peril.
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X

From The Nation's Editorial Diary
September 22. British gunboats have got into trouble on the
Yangtze at Wanhsien, twelve hundred miles from the sea. A
British steamer nosed its way into the midst of a local war, capsizing
a sampan loaded with Chinese troops. A dozen Chinese, apparently,
were killed, and the Chinese held the British responsible. They seized
two British merchant ships and took six British officers prisoner.
Thereupon three British warships went into action, rescuing five of
the six officers but leaving the ships in Chinese hands. Seven men
wearing His Majesty's uniform lost their lives in the process. They
were brave; perhaps they were heroic.
But this heroism loses its glamor when seen through Chinese eyes.
What business had British warships a thousand miles in the interior
of China? The British gunboats con~luded the "heroic" episode by
bombarding the defenseless city of Wanhsien-"effectively," the cables
say, estimating that as a result there are five thousand fewer men and
women and children to munch rice in that miserable city. And now the
cables burn with stories of protest meetings called by the foreigners
in Shanghai and Hankow, demanding "strong" action! The British
Government has ordered the flagship of its Asiatic squadron, with a
prince of the royal blood aboard, to Hankow, 600 miles from the sea;
and the United States has concentrated five warships at that same
far-off city, with a dangerous if traditional sense of the necessity for
solidarity among the foreigners. Fortunately, the British cannot quite
decide against whom to vent their wrath. There is just one way to
keep the foreign Powers from inextricably involving themselves in
China's civil wars; and that is for their intrusive sloops and gunboats and auxiliary merchantmen to head full-steam for the open sea.
October 6. Viscount Cecil was about to deliver a glowing tribute
to the new spirit of peace which had cast such a radiant glow over
the September sessions of the League Assembly when the Chinese delegate arose. He asked permission to speak four minutes, obtained it,
began with the smiling announcement that the Chinese Government
intended to present the League with a Chinese encyclopedia, and then,
while the delegates were still beaming with appreciation, proceeded
to inform the League of the kind of peace waged by Viscount Cecil's
Government on the Yangtze River in the heart of China.
The Chinese delegate sat down. Viscount Cecil arose. "In heated
terms" he denounced "this strange course of procedure." The Chinese delegate, it seems, should have informed the British of his intentions beforehand. Chu's course was "undiplomatic." Scant attention
was paid by Viscount Cecil or by the assembled delegates to the ques41

tiona, What had been done on the Yangtze, what could be done to prevent further slaughter, whether the prevailing state of "peace" in the
Far East was in fact menaced. The Geneva state of mind was probably accurately described by the serious correspondent of the New
York Times who reported that
There is no question in the mind of anybody that the Chinese
have the right to present to the League any situation which they
consider dangerous to peace. But it is considered bad judgment on
their part to break the rules of the Assembly and beg four minutes'
time on the agenda immediately before the British delegate's reading
of a carefully prepared statement on disarmament and make a discourse on a matter which they do not intend to follow up. The prestige
of Chu is held to be irreparably ruined.

And there you have the vice of the Anglo-Saxon mind in a nutshell.
It does not matter what one says or does, but one must do it in the
best form and according to the international book of etiquette.
Hankow has just been taken by Chiang Kai-shek, generalissimo of
the forces of the Nationalist Government of Canton, and his Southern
army is winning new victories in every direction. Part of its success is no doubt attributable to its superior military training; most
of it is due to the fact that it is the one army in China which is loyal
not to an individual but to a cause. The Canton Government has for
a year and a quarter maintained a boycott of British goods in the
rich markets of South China and has sapped the strength of the
British merchant fortress of Hongkong: it sweeps northward because
it has expressed the new national pride and the Chinese people recognize in it a loyalty to China which they cannot find in the armies
subsidized by Britain and by Japan.

October 20. Canton ceased turning over the salt taxes of that
province for the service of the foreign debt, to which they are pledged,
away back in 1918. Local chieftains have occasionally done as much,
and the warlord of Tientsin, favorite of the foreigners though he was,
followed suit a few months ago. And now even Sun Chuan-fong, the
last hope of those who fear the progress of the Southern "Red" armies,
has announced that the salt revenues of his provinces will be needed
for his military campaign. Canton has gone further still, issuing a
new schedule of domestic taxes which the foreigners say is a violation
of the treaties; and the Peking Government has announced that it
will not renew its treaty with Belgium, which the foreigners also say
it has no right to do. But foreign complaints are unavailing. China's
very chaos is an asset in this crisis. An old Chinese proverb says
that you cannot hang a jellyfish upon a nail. The foreign Powers had
their chance to modify the treaties by mutual agreement; but instead
they hemmed and hawed, and agreed to move a single step if the
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Chinese would move miles, and out of all the conferences cameexcept for the rendition of the Shanghai Mixed Court, where even
the treaties gave the foreigners no excuse for their action-just exactly
nothing.
A ·d iplomatic training is a poor background for dealing with a
continental revolution. It prepares men to study texts and precedents,
to live by the letter of the law-and in China today an ancient civilization is slipping over a precipice, 1a nd the rules by which the West
had learned to deal with it are sliding too. The old treaties still
exist on paper; but the conditions out of which they were born have
gone forever, and there is no Western-minded government in China
to devise forms to bridge the gap. The diplomats know that the old
status is gone-that the regime under which foreigners dictate China's
customs schedules, collect her taxes, police her rivers with their foreign
navies, and govern her greatest commercial cities can at best hardly
survive another decade-but they do not know enough to make concessions gracefully. Instead, they protest every violation of the old
code, stand on rights that cannot be enforced, and end by making
themselves as futilely ridiculous as the puppet governments which,
unnoticed, succeed one another at Peking.
Wherever a foreign gunboat sits in Chinese waters the Chinese
coolie begins to see another irritating symbol of the treaties which
claim for the white men superior rights and privileges. At any
moment a spark may light in the international powder-magazine. Yet
the newspapers of October 10 report the arrival of more American
warships in Chinese waters, bringing our total to fifty-two!
November 10. China's civil war has stopped for breath. The
Canton armies have swarmed over nearly half of China, and the next
step may well be negotiation rather than new battles. The gallant
little army from the South has suffered heavy losses and needs time
to organize civil administration in its rear. Its first attempt to take
Shanghai-by the Russian method of stirring up revolt within the
enemy's ranks-has failed; but no one who knows the Chinese Nationalists believes that the first attempt will be the last. Meanwhile, of
course, Canton's enemies, however much they may have fought each
other in the past, are patching up a skin-saving peace with each other.
Sun Chuan-fong, master of Shanghai, may swear blood brotherhood
with Chang Tso-lin, the war-lord of the North, but he is unlikely to
renounce his ambition to rule his native province of Shantung, held
now by one of Chang's henchmen. These ambitious personalities
cannot in the long run prevail against the cohesive force of nationalist
principles.
Nov&rnber 24. Belgium has no gunboats in Chinese waters and
no garrison in the Legation Quarter of Peking. The Great Powers
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are right in thinking that China has begun with Belgium in order
to set a precedent where precedents will be most easily established ;
and that she intends to proceed from the particular case to the general
application. The Chinese Government abrogated the old treaty with
Belgium and announced its willingness to negotiate a new treaty on
Ill reciprocal basis, but not to repeat the humiliating lessons of the
past. And while the Powers have been mumbling and grumbling, and
Belgium has been suggesting reference of the question to the World
Court at the Hague, the plain fact remains that Belgian citizens in
China today are without extraterritorial privileges.
The Cantonese army, advancing in the name of nationalism, has
been sweeping across province after province. Meanwhile, in this
process of civil war, the Chinese factions are learning how to fight.
Canton's victories were not won by vast masses of coolies fighting
as listlessly as chessmen. Canton fights with small bodies of welltrained and well-armed men-and wins. China now has at least three
first-class arsenals, and others of smaller caliber. The end of the
"chaos" which appalled Mr. Strawn may be a first-class military Power
in a nation of 400,000,000 souls, animated and united by a dislike of
Westerners. Our State Department and the other foreign offices
would do well to rouse themselves and look for opportunities to prove
that friendship for China which all politicians profess. Japan has
reversed her role in recent years; she is the one foreign Power reported
sympathetic to China's action upon the Belgian treaty. She knows
China. If the time has not yet come it may soon arrive when talk
of a pan-Asiatic bloc will be real.

December 8. Old China, struggling to give birth to a modern
nation, is in a stage of spasmodic convulsions. She has been begging
the Powers to leave her alone, to stop dosing her with their medicine.
And at a moment when she seems to have some hope of pulling herself together, when the Canton group is at last uniting the country,
the Powers, deaf these many years, suddenly present their report,
which says in effect: We will not change our tactics until you get
well. The Extraterritoriality Commission, with Silas Strawn as
chairman, having spent some months studying China, notes her chaotic
condition and coolly concludes, if the preliminary summaries are to
be trusted, that this is no time to change medicine. In the future,
maybe, if conditions mend, perhaps, the Powers will consider, possihly,
local change.s in their claims of extraterritoriality.
This is nonsense. It exhibits an <appalling lack of sense of proportion. Here is a solemn report, signed by the representatives of
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, France, the British Empire, and the United States-the
"Treaty Powers." Italy, Spain, and Portugal are ruled by military
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juntas, Japan by a despotic clique; Britain holds India by force alone;
Belgium and Italy have compounded .their debts, but France is simply
stalling, with no apparent intention of paying her debt to the United
States; and the United States seems utterly incapaible of solving its
own gunman and lynching problems. Yet the representatives of these
nations presume to s1t in judgment on China, to complain that she
is governed by military leaders, that her treasury is depleted, that
"the extension and protection of the new legal and judicial systems
are being retarded," and smugly demand that China reform herself.
Before the Powers withdraw their claims to separate jurisdiction in
China, they assert, China must reform her police, her prisons, her
commercial code ("including negotiable-instruments law, maritime
law, and insurance law"), establish modern detention-houses, and so
on through a long string of requirements to the condescending
conclusion that
After the principal items thereof have been carried out the
Powers concerned, if so desired by the Chinese Government, might consider the abolition of extraterritoriality, according to such progressive
schemes (whether ge<>graphical, partial, or otherwise) as may be
agreed upon.
Jatnuary 5, 1927. Great Britain has turned a flying ·s omersault in
its Chinese policy and come out for virtual recognition of the Canton
Government and admission of China's right to levy customs taxes
in excess of the treaty rates. Our own State Department, which has
sat quietly on a shelf, doing nothing but •a dmire its own benevolent
intentions, must be wondering what kind of earthquake has hit
Downing Street. The Chinese know the answer very well: It is the
economic boycott. For sixteen months Canton boycotted British goods
in South China, nearly ruining British Hongkong; now, with the
Cantonese occupying the Yangtze Valley, the British face a possible
extension of this devastating policy of economic starvation. In the
old days-not so very long ago-the white men in the East had a conviction that the Oriental understood nothing except force. The Chinese, cannier, 'h ave a conviction of their own: that the Occidental
understands nothing except money; the place to hit him is in the pocketbook. This is the second great revolution in foreign policy which
China has achieved. Japan, since the Washington Conference, has
adopted, •a t least in her public actions, the role of a friend of the
new China. Now Great Britain is following suit. America's trade
ranks third in China, ·b ehind Japan's and England's; apparently our
diplomacy also ranks a poor third.
January 12. For two centuries Europe has dominated the earth.
The United States, in the beginning, was a mere outpost of Europe.
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But times have changed.

The power and position of America in the
world today are one witness of the fact; statistics compiled for the
coming Economic Conference at Geneva tell another part of t he story.
Comparing 1925 with 1913 these figures show that whereas Europe's
production of foodstuffs and r•a w materials has increased less than
5 per cent, her foreign trade has fallen by 6 per cent, while Asia's
production has gained 20 per cent and her trade 36 per cent, and
North America has gained 26 per cent in production and 37 per cent
in foreign trade. One may say that this is the fault of the war, and
think that the world will placidly resume its pre-war ways. Yet perhaps the war was but a chapter in a story which, half-noticed, was
writing itself before that cataclysm brought sudden ruin to the old
continent.
History, looked at in the large, records no lasting predominance
of the European peoples. Four or five centuries· ago they started
voyaging with a zest and persistence such as voyagers had never had
before; and accordingly they discovered lost or unknown continents
and began the development of the prodigious international trade of
today. Within the last two centuries they have spread their political
control over the rest of the earth's peoples. But what are two centuries, or even four or five, in the history of the earth-what can they
tell of the capacities of a race? China's civilization is four or five
millenniums old; and throughout that immense period, century by
century, she had a richer civilization to boast of than Western Europe
-until the puny fragment of time which has elapsed since the Industrial Revolution gave the West its present driving power. Today the
West, having conquered the East, has also given it the weapons with
which to reassert its ancient preeminence. Russians, schooled in Germany and America, travel as adviser-s with Chiang Kai-shek's Cantonese armies; a British general buys in Japan supplies for Chang
Tso-lin's Mukden ar·s enal; Americans direct the technical work of the
Kiangnan arsenal; General Wood is giving the youth of the Philippines military training; and Mussolini's gun-laden merchant ships are
ready to sell to any buyer. Where we have superiority-in military
science, in technical processes-we are selling out to the East as fast
as the East can afford to purchase.
A new tide is running. We have never properly appreciated the
historic significance of Turkey's successful denunciation of the
shackling capitulations. China is following in Turkey's steps. Great
Britain, beaten by Canton's year-long boycott of her goods, has made a
sudden reversal of policy, and offered to agree to steps which a year
ago she contemptuously refused-and, more significant still, the Chinese today refuse her offers of compromise as too slight. A quarter
century ago the Powers, by a short military expedition, brought the old
Chinese Empire to its knees. Today they are rightly afraid to try force
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on chaotic young China-the sturdy child has in the interim learned
too much about force.
January 19. From the "British Concession" at Hankow the
frightened British withdrew, faced by an overwhelming Chinese mob,
on January 5, 1927.
Two facts stand out: First, the American consulate and the American business firms, flying American flags in Chinese territory close
to the British Concession, and the missionaries across the river in
Chinese Wuchang went unharmed while mobs raged through the British territory, tearing down the Union Jack and defacing the British
war memorial. The American policy of refusing territorial concessions
proved itself wise in a stormy time. Second, it was the coolie-mass
whioh swept the British out of Hankow, not Russian-trained soldiers
from Canton. The spirit behind that mob is no product of one government's ukases; it is a reaction to ·a century of foreign domineering;
it cannot be stopped; it may be silenced for a moment at one spot or
another, but it will sweep on across China.
Thus far in this crisis the British, bearing the brunt of the Chinese attack, have acted with discretion. On January 3 British marines
and armed volunteers guarding the Hankow Concession stood off a
surging Chinese mob with the butts of their guns, obeying a London
order not to fire. Furthermore, the Cantonese had warned them that
if they did fire not a foreigner would be left alive in Hankow. The
press dispatches, almost all of British origin (the Associated Press
unfortunately depends upon Reuter, a British news agency, for its
Chinese news, and the United Press service is inadequate), report
that the British soldiers were singularly restrained; the dispatches,
however, mention a Chinese demand for apology for the brutality of
the marines, while omitting to tell in what the brutality consisted.
On January 4 the foreign soldiers were withdrawn, protection being
left to the British-trained Chinese police and to an outside cordon of
Cantonese troops. The mobs broke through these lines and hoisted
the red flag of South China in place of the Union Jack over the British
official buildings. The Union Jack Club temporarily became headquarters of a labor union. British women were evacuated; British
men were concentrated in the buildings of the Asiatic Petroleum Company. (Meanwhile, American business houses a few blocks away in
the old Russian Concession which is now Chinese territory remained
open for business.) On January 6, fortunately, it rained; the spirit
of the mob was dampened; and order was restored. Regular Cantonese
troops took over control of the British Concession. At Kiukiang, 130
miles downstream, the British Concession has also fallen into Chinese
hands.
47

February 2. The cables are full of pacific speeches, ·b ut from the
lesser dispatches we as·semble the following amazing data: On J anuary 12 there wer·e in the Yangtze River in China 9 British gunboats,
1 sloop, 6 destroyers, and 5 cruisers. Three more cruisers, an aircraft
carrier with airplanes, and other British warcraft were in other Chinese waters. In all, there were 62 fQreign warships-British, American, French, and Japanese--in the Chinese Yangtze River! On January 19 the British cruisers Frobisher, Delhi, Dragon, and Danae left
Malta for China; on January 24, 1,000 royal marines sailed from
Portsmouth for China on board the Zeeland, and the White Star liner
Megantic was in drydock after being fitted as ·a troopship for China;
four more battalions of infantry, comprising 140 officers and 3,424
men, and the Fifth Armored Car Company were under orders to sail
from England; two battalions in Malta were also under orders; two
liners had been chartered to sail from India for China; the Durham
Light Infantry, the Gloucestershires, and a battalion Qf Punjab infantry were reported mobilizing; and three companies of "Punjab IndianBriti.sh soldiers were dispatched from Hongkong to Shang~hai"; on
January 24 it was announced that an expeditionary force of 12,000
men, with armored cars, would leave England at once. Actions speak
louder than words. The United States has 55 warships, 8,000 bluejackets, and 800 infantrymen in or close to China. Is there something
sinister and secret behind the fine words of the statesmen?
Febn,{)(Lry 9. The Chinese know that the only British concessions
which have come back to them are in Hankow and Kiukiang, and that
those were won by Chinese mobs which overran them. The way to
teach the Chinese a better way is to prove that something can be
attained by peaceful methods.
Thus far, in all the r·ecent chaos and civil war, with riots in a
score of cities, missions requisitioned, concessions overrun, not a single
foreigner has lost his life. The warnings to women and children to
leave China apparently have been issued by flighty consuls in the
safest treaty ports. Perhaps it is just as well; if the consuls had
foreknowledge of the plans for the vast international armada they
did well to order their nationals out of China. The first repercussion
of the seizure of Hankow by the Southerners was a demand by the
Northerners for return of the Tientsin concessions in their territory;
the first effect of the announcement of the British expeditionary force
was a declaration by Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, generalissimo of the North, that if the British landed troops in China
the North would join the South to drive them out-and the next step
was to appeal to the League of Nations against the British invaders.
But the cities under foreign administration which have grown up
at Shanghai are largely populated by Chinese. T:h e so-called French
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and International Settlements between them have a population of
nearly two millions, of which only 50,000 are whites. Eighty per cent
of the land, even, is owned by Chinese. It is possible to land as many
troops as there are foreigners in Shanghai, and to hold the city; but
is it worth it? What is the use of the foreigners existing there if
they cannot do business with the hinterland, if their troops arouse
against them a resentment which makes trade impossible?

.

February UJ. White men's arrogance was never better displayed
than in Secretary Kellogg's demand that the foreign settlement of
Shanghai be made a neutral zone. There are, he said, 30,000 foreigner-s, including 4,000 Americans, in Shanghai, and they should be spared
the rigors of civil war. It happens that Shanghai is a part of China,
and there are some two million Chinese in Shanghai who, whatever
happens, will undoubtedly suffer more than any of the foreigners.
The white men in the East persist in thinking that they are entitled
to exemption from the perils and difficulties which yellow men have
to suffer.

"Wanted: Marines, for service in China," the recruiting boards
read all over the United States. The marines have been withdrawn
from the mail-trucks, mobilized at the ports, and, like the British regiments, are being transshipped for the Orient. We have no concessions in China, it is true; our officials make as pretty speeches as the
British; but we have sixty warships in Eastern water·s, and will soon
have 15,000 troops available. Does anyone in Washington expect the
Chinese to take our words seriously when our actions speak the
language of war?
February 28. It is the foreign-trained men who clamor most
against the foreigner. Eugene Chen, the Canton FOTeign Minister
who has been most bitter against the aliens, is himself of alien birth
and training. He is a native of Trinidad and was educated in England;
it was the British who taught him his present race consciousness. His
predecessors in that office were also foreign trained-Fu Ping-sheung,
graduate of the British University of Hongkong, and C. C. Wu, who
went from the public high school at Atlantic City, New Jersey, to the
University of London. The Peking Minister of Foreign Affairs who
forced Belgium to negotiate new equal treaties, Wellington Koo, is a
graduate of our own Columbia University; his predecessors hold their
academic degrees from Virginia and Yale. Chu Chao-hsin, who uses
the League of Nations as a sounding-board to broadcast his attacks
on British policy, has degrees from New York and Columbia, and
most of his colleagues are foreign trained.
This is no accident. The nationalist movement is strongest where
foreign influence has been most intense. Canton is its natural center
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because it has been the center of intercourse with foreigners for more
than a century. Western influence in China has acted like a vaccination; it has first made the patient ill, while at the same time inoculating him with the germs of resistan.ce to the disease. The more
troops the British ship to China, the more bitter will be the resistance
to the foreigners.
Matrch 9. At Shanghai the British are defending a line which
rertches far beyond the boundaries of the International Settlement
into purely Chinese territory. They have not bothered to give any
excu.se, not even to explain that their promises to observe China's
national integrity are mere "scraps of paper"; like the Germans in
Belgium thirteen years ago, they have simply taken the most convenient course. Meanwhile Sun Chuan-fong, recently lord of five
provinces, is fading out of the picture. His defeat by the Cantonese
near Hangchow was a tremendous blow to his prestige; and the reckless butchery of Cantonese sympathizers by his underling in Shanghai
lost him the last vestige of sympathy among his own people. (It is
instructive to reflect what might have been the comments of the
British press had a Cantonese general rather than a friend of England's beheaded a hundred of his opponents.) Chang Tsung-chang,
the bandit chief of Shantung, is moving his troops into the Shanghai
region, but the force of public opinion, which mysteriously wins
battles in China, is against him, and he will suffer the same eclipse
as Sun Chuan-fong.
March 16. Doubtless the American marines who had been cooped
up on shipboard in the river off Shanghai were enormously relieved
when the order came to disembark and march, drums beating and
flags flying, through Nanking Road and out to J essfield Park. And
doubtless the Americans who live in Shanghai under the protection
of !the British flag were glad to see this visible evidence that the
United States stood shoulder to shoulder with Britain in defense of
the foreign lives and property centering in Shanghai. Unfortunately,
it meant more than that. To the watching Chinese it meant that
America indorsed Britain's action in invading Chinese territory
because it happened to be more convenient to do so.
MaTch 29. Hundreds of missionaries have refused to heed the
panicky "orders" of their consuls to abandon their posts. Canton
Christian College, for instance, has just transformed its constitution
and become, essentially, an American-subsidized Chinese university.
It will have a Chinese president and a Chinese majority on the board
of directors; long before the storm surprised slower-moving bodies it
made religious instruction elective. The physical property remains
American, rented to the Chinese board at one dollar a year. Mission
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schools which thus follow the national pulse of China remain open,
splendidly useful examples of the best that America can give, when
stiffer-backed, more consciously foreign institutions close or even suffer
mob violence.

March 30. The persistent misreporting of the Chinese situation
by Frederick Moore, correspondent of the New York Times, deserves
notice. He did not like the Cantonese; therefore he announced that
they were split by internal dissensions, and militarily weak. Here are
samples from his Shanghai dispatches:
March 1. There is no evidence of a prospective battle, and it
is confidently believed in well-informed quarters that the customary negotiations have already begun.
March 5. Continued reliable reports . . . support other indications that the Southerners have reached the end of their military
capacities.
March 6. Chang Tsung-chang's army is considered the best
in China, excluding Chang Tso-lin's.
March 7. Marshal Chang Tsung-chang, by movements of
troops along the railways south of the Yangtze in Kiangsu Province, makes daily more secure the North's retention of Shanghai .
. . . The Northern position militarily i·s incalculably the stronger
and the Northern armies are regarded by foreign military attaches
as infinitely better than the Southern.
March 9. Further facts and statements bear out the report
that Chiang Kai-shek . . . the Southern commander-in-chief . . .
does not intend to push military operations against Marshal Chang
Tsung-chang's Nanking and Shanghai defenses.
March 17. The coolest and best-informed foreigners still
agree that Shanghai is unlikely to be taken by the Southern armies
for many weeks, possibly months.
A cub reporter could hardly have been more brilliantly and consistently
mistaken. About midnight on March 20 the Southern armies entered
the native city of Shanghai.
Will the Nationalists, hitherto inspired by a gospel, be able to
digest the mere militarists who will join them because of their victories? There are reports of an anti-Russian party within the Knomintang-which means a party favoring the old kind of personal military dictatorship as opposed to group civilian rule.
April 6. On the tenth anniversary of America's entrance into the
World War she hovers on the brink of an Asiatic World-War. The
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headlines flare; the rumors fly, burst sensationally, and fall like dead
skyrockets; the atrocity stories have begun. "Heroism" stories fill
the columns; hysterical women refugees are quoted as impartial witnesses; and when other devices fail, the correspondents fill their space
with imaginative accounts of what might have happened if this warship had not laid down a barrage, that admiral had not threatened a
bombardment, or if the foreign fleet in the river had not made an
impressive show of force. The stage is set; the mob spirit is being
invoked.
What has happened? In the headlines two hundred Americans
were imperiled; in the early dispatches-even in one of Admiral Williams's reports-"a number of American civilians were killed." Admiral Hough, the hot-headed seaman who bombarded Nanking once
and wanted to bombard it again, reported his fear "that the number of
dead is large." In the end, it turns out that one American man was
killed, one woman missionary was twice wounded, a sailor was also
wounded, and a Standard Oil official sprained his ankle. Three or four
other foreigners were killed; several buildings were burned, and more
were looted. Some of the American men were forced to give up their
outer clothes; some of the women had their clothes torn by jostling
crowds.
Who was responsible? Some say that the American refugees were
caught between cross fires when the Cantonese soldiers were entering
the city; others that Northern refugees were responsible; others insist
that the looting and shooting was an "obviously predetermined attack,"
and still other reports agree that it was the work of undisciplined
Cantonese soldiers and sympathizers who arrived ahead of their officers. The last party of one hundred and twenty American missionaries
to escape declares that "the [Chinese] students at the university had
procured the protection of this building [their refuge at Nanking University] by the attendance of an officer and a group of soldiers." These
refugees, whom Admiral Hough insisted could be saved only by bombarding Nanking, reached the warships escorted by a Nationalist
guard! They say:
A Kuomintang military detachment was sent to the university,
and in carriages, rickshas, and on foot the caravan of the foreigners
made its way without molestation to the riverfront at Hsiakwan and
were there turned over to foreign marines . . . . The help rendered by
the Red Swastika Society in securing and paying for carriages and
rickshas and the kindness of its officers greatly aided the evacuation.

When the Cantonese general reached the city the looting stopped.
We have not seen an iota of evidence that higher Nationalist officers
had anything to do with the looting and shooting except to stop it.
Is not the real peril in the foreigners' own state of mind? To
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them every foreign life is sacred; Chinese lives do not matter at all.
China's civil war, Chinese Nationalism are, to the foreign business
men in China, mere interruptions of trade, and should be repressed.
The correspondents, unfortunately, reflect this blindness; the total
inability to comprehend a world crisis could hardly be more patent
than in the reports of Admiral Hough's bombardment of Nanking. It
is safe to say that the ordinary American newspaper reader does not
yet know that Admiral Hough's guns killed many Chinese. All we hear
of is that one American was killed, and the American Government has
the effrontery to talk of protesting to the Chinese!
Was the barrage necessary to save the American lives? At this
distance we cannot tell; nor can we trust the guesses of excited refugees. One may, however, note that the Japanese laid down no barrage
and made no ultimatums.
April 13. Surely the American Government does not intend to
enunciate the doctrine that its gunboats and marines will protect all
Americans in China, no matter where they are, what they do, or at
what cost. If they are caught in the fire and flame of civil war, it cannot be our duty to "protect" them at the cost of Chinese lives. What
is this ghastly talk of blockading the Yangtze Valley but the assertion
of a right of foreigners to starve and stop a civil war in order to
defend the right of their alien nationals to live where even Chinese
are unsafe?
That the British are alarmed is natural. Their Oriental empire is
built upon the caste system. If China succeeds in establishing race
equality within her borders, the example will shake the foundations of
white domination in the Malay Peninsula, at Singapore, and in India.
Of course the British strain every nerve to obtain the cooperation of
the United States and of the other Powers in their desperate effort
to rebuttress their empire. They have even brought pressure to bear
on German banks in Shanghai-which are in debt to the larger British
banks-to force the Germans in Shanghai to modify their pro-Chinese
attitude. The American correspondents in Shanghai seem to have
caught the infectious hysteria of the British in that city; their cables
are less news than editorial pleas for an alliance with Great Britain .
. . . To join with Britain in this crisis, asserting our will by force,
would be a plain warning to China that for her there is a White Peril.
It might end by creating a Yellow Peril which does not yet exist.
April 20. · One hundred and seventy-two fighting ships, flying the
flags of eight non-Chinese nations, besides thirty or forty colliers, tugs,
and transports, are now riding in Chinese waters. Forty-five of them
are at Shanghai, forty-six are patrolling the Yangtze, and the rest are
stationed up and down the China. coast. America has three admirals
on duty in China, Great Britain three, France one, and Japan one.
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If anyone still thought that this enormous naval concentration was
intended simply and solely to protect the lives and property of foreigners in China he must have been sorely puzzled by the events of
April 6 and 7, when the Dutch dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Peking,
after consultation with the British and American ministers, gave
Chang Tso-lin permission to violate the Boxer Protocol and enter the
Legation Quarter in order to sack a portion of the Russian Legation;
the French authorities permitted Chinese police to enter the French
Concession in Tientsin in order to raid the Russian consulate there ;
and the British and Americans on the Municipal Council of Shanghai
posted about the Russian Consulate White Russian guards, who
searched every person going in or coming out, including Chinese civil
officials. More, these Russians turn out to have been members of the
Northern army who were taken into the International Settlement after
their defeat and immediately incorporated in its police force! (It is
not generally understood in this country that whole regiments of the
anti-Nationalist armies in China are made up of half-starved "White"
Russians.)
"The belief grows among military and naval experts," Thomas F.
Millard cables to the New York World from Shanghai, "that the sending of foreign troops to China is preliminary to the expected clash
between Great Britain and Russia." It looks that way; it looks also
as if Great Britain were utilizing the events in China to make the
United States her ally in such a contest. "Why," Eugene Chen, the
Nationalist Foreign Minister, asked the British Minister, "does Britain
bring her quarrel with Russia into our country?" Why, indeed? And
an American may well inquire why America, too, has to be dragged
into Britain's struggle to maintain her dominance in Asia.
Those are right who see in the Chinese drama a struggle between
Russia and Britain. But in this struggle Britain stands as the representative not of industry but of empire, and Russia as the friend not
of communism but of national freedom. The simultaneous attacks
upon the Russian consulates, sponsored by the foreign Powers, were
evidently part of a concerted effort to disgrace Russia with the Nationalists by embroiling her with the Northern Chinese. Russia refused
to be trapped; she protested, of course, but made no threats. From
this diplomatic intrigue America ought to hold aloof, sympathetic with
Nationalist China and uninterested in defending the fortresses of
empire.
May 4. The State Department, apparently impressed by the
unanimity of American opinion against intervention there, has acted
as a mildly restraining influence upon the allied alien Powers in China,
but on the spot the ever-ardent marines are always eager for excitement. Americans scaled the wall of the Soviet Legation in Peking and
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occupied one part of it, not content to wait until the Chinese police
found the keys to the buildings they had raided; American warships
join in convoying British merchant ships on the Yangtze; American marines "rescued" three Americans from the Hankow picl{et-police. Imagine the excitement in this country if Chinese marines should land at St.
Louis and forcibly take three of their countrymen away from an American police station! The Associated Press correspondent at Shanghai
has computed that American vessels in China inland waters have been
fired at 26 times within six weeks; and 15 times the American ships
returned fire. rt· is now the official policy to engage in battle when
fired upon. It sounds like bravery-but isn't it about the kind of bravery displayed by a young man who boldly demolishes a hornet's nest
with his fist?
Always, in time of crisis, the foreigners in China look to a "strong
man" for salvation. And always the strong man turns out to be stuffed
with straw. It was so after the Taiping rebellion a half century ago,
when the foreigners helped restore the tottering Manchu power; it
was so in 1911, when they lent Yuan Shih-kai millions to crush the
democratic South; it has been so successively with Chang Tso-lin and
Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuang-fang, and now with Chiang Kai-shek.
Chiang is of different stuff, indeed, from the bandit generals against
whom he has fought; but he has broken with the civilian government
to which he owed allegiance and is seeking to establish a new government which will be as directly dependent upon him as recent governments in Peking have been upon Chang Tso-lin. Upon the labor
unions which had been his civilian allies he has turned with a ruthlessness which none of his rivals has ever surpassed. Two hundred
union leaders have been slain by Chiang's men at Shanghai, and their
organizations suppressed; and similar tactics have been followed by
his allies in Canton and at Nanking. This is something else than
"crushing communism," and it is a poor record with which to proclaim
oneself heir to the democratic nationalism of Sun Yet-sen.
Ma;y 11. American warships convoy British merchant ships up
and down the Yangtze; American troops in China act not only in cooperation with the British but on occasion under command of British
senior officers. Is this insubordination, or has Washington a double face?
A frightened little foreign community in Shanghai seems to be
stampeding half the world. Many Americans on the spot have succumbed to the panic; the American Chamber of Commerce has even
ousted the brave American editor, J. B. Powell, who objected to the
provocative policy of Shanghai's Municipal Council. But the American people as a whole, it is plainer every day, do not want to be drawn
into intervention. Will Washington not heed them, and put a checkrein on the hotheads in China?
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